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Abstract
Three Essays on International Trade:
Strategic Trade Policies, Intra-Industry Trade, and
Income Convergence
Aziz İbrahim Sağlam
This dissertation illustrates the effects of managerial delegation on
strategic trade policies and the relationship between intra-industry trade and
income convergence. In the first essay strategic trade policy under duopoly is
investigated in a multistage game model with endogenous timing of trade policy.
The analysis also includes the separation of ownership and management for each
firm. The study is integrated in a single analytical framework. The results show
that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home
government commits not to use countervailing duties: the home government sets
its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its
export subsidy at stage two. As a result both countries are better off when the
home government is the Stackelberg leader. The second paper analyzes the
relationship between international trade and income convergence among
countries by focusing on groups of countries comprising major trade partners.
For each country, primary intra-industry trade partners are determined and trade
groups are created. The behavior of income differentials within these groups is
examined. The majority of these intra-industry trade-based groups exhibit
significant income convergence. The third paper provides recent evidence on
determinants of the bilateral intra-industry trade in a multi-country & multiindustry framework. The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry
trade is positively correlated with average GNP, average GNP/capita, and the
existence of a common border; and it is negatively correlated with difference in
GNP, difference in GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are highly
significant statistically. The EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected
positive sign and are highly significant statistically. The regression coefficients
of the language dummy variables have a positive sign, but their level of statistical
significance varies.
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Chapter 1. General Overview of the Dissertation
The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are often violated in the real
world. Traditional trade theory based on perfect competition does not effectively explain
phenomena such as intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade between similar countries.
Moreover, such models failed to successfully integrate some important policy related
considerations, such as increasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing, R&D, and inter-firm
strategic rivalries. Effective analysis of these topics requires imperfect competition, which
together with increasing returns to scale is one of the main characteristics of many of today’s
industries, especially of those in the industrialized countries. As new theories of imperfectly
competitive markets have developed, game-theoretic approach of strategic trade policy began to
emerge in the early 1980’s.

As a strategic trade policy instrument, an export subsidy used by the foreign government
could be “countervailed” by a domestic import tariff. The interesting point about these
countervailing effects is that they do not eliminate incentives to use active strategic trade policy,
and the policy equilibrium normally implies positive subsidies and tariffs. Collie (1994) examines
a country’s optimal response to foreign export subsides. In his model, the home government uses
an import tariff to extract rents from the foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the
domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy
to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. He shows that the unique equilibrium
sequence of moves of the governments is that the home government announces its trade policy
before the foreign government does.

1

It may be of a particular interest to integrate the strategic trade policy with the
hierarchical games in firm theory. It is generally argued that a proper analysis of the firm’s
objective function should be based on the analysis of the owner-manager relationship. A
manager’s objective depends on the structure of the incentives that his owner sets to motivate
him. Owners often index managerial compensation to profits, sales, output, quality, and some
other variables. Even if the owners want to maximize profits, the incentive system they design
may imply managerial incentives which are different from profit maximization.

Sklivas (1987) addresses the question of whether firms with separate owners and
managers maximize profits. He examines an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or
prices, as in the Cournot or Bertrand models, and owners choose their managers’ incentives.
Owner evaluates his manager’s performance according to a measure, which is a linear
combination of his firm’s profits and revenues. The higher is this measure, the higher is the
manager’s payment. When managers compete in quantities, firms in the owner-manager game
produce outputs greater than the output in the standard1 Cournot model. This results in firms’
having lower profits than the profit-maximizing firms in the standard Cournot model. When
managers compete in prices, firms receive higher profits than in the standard Bertrand model.

In what follows, Chapter 2 is concerned with strategic managerial delegation and its
implications for international trade policy. Corporate firms, with separation of management and
ownership, compete in international markets. We ask how trade policy affects the incentive to
managers, which in turn affects the impact of trade policy on prices and quantities. This chapter
combines the models of Collie (1994) and Sklivas (1987) in a single integrated analytical
framework. The integrated model will have a modest contribution to the literature by
1

In the standard Cournot or Bertrand model, ownership and management are not separated for each firm.
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investigating the strategic trade policies under duopoly in a multistage game with endogenous
timing of trade policy when the ownership and the management are separated for each firm.

Trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade policy decisions is
endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign governments
independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or at stage two.
Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare.
The home government uses an import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm and a production
subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government
uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. If, at stage zero,
both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then the outcome will
be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. If the home [foreign] government chooses to move at
stage one and the foreign [home] government chooses to move at stage two, then the outcome
will be a Stackelberg game where the home [foreign] government is the Stackelberg leader. At
stage three the owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts with their managers that
specify how they will be rewarded. Finally, the managers will simultaneously choose their firms’
outputs. The appropriate solution for this multistage game is the subgame perfect equilibrium,
which is obtained by applying the Nash equilibrium to all the stages of the game by the process of
backward induction.

The results show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the
home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government
sets its export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government
commits itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export
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subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries
are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move
game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country
gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that
imperfect competition does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the
home country should commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie
(1994), our results show that home and foreign welfares are higher, when the ownership and the
management are separated for each firm.

Chapter 3 of the dissertation is about the convergence of economic growth which is one
of the most important issues in modern economics. In a world in which countries exchange
goods, factors, and ideas; international linkages are what drive any convergence process. Though
there is evidence of income convergence among some of the wealthy countries (Baumol, 1986;
Baumol et al., 1989), it is not obvious why some subsets of these countries exhibit greater
convergence than others, while other subsets of countries display no convergence tendencies at
all. This chapter analyzes this issue from the perspective of trade’s contribution to the process. It
examines the relationship between international trade and income convergence among countries
by focusing on groups of countries forming major trade partners.

In analyzing the factors that determine the extent of intra-industry trade in an intercountry context, Linder (1961) advanced the hypothesis that the extent of trade in differentiated
products will be the greater, the more similar are income levels among the trading countries. This
hypothesis reflects the assumption that similarities in income levels are associated with
similarities in demand structures. The results of Chapter 3 are not sufficient to differentiate
between the hypothesis that countries that trade a great deal with one another tend to converge,
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and the alternative hypothesis that similar countries tend to trade more. However, an analysis of
the relationship between trade liberalization and income convergence (Ben-David, 1993, 1994a)
suggests that it is trade liberalization that produces income convergence, rather than the other way
around. Although no intra-group income convergence was evident before the trade reforms,
significant convergence, together with significant increases in the volume of trade, began to occur
simultaneously with the removal of the trade barriers. These findings provide evidence that it is
the removal of obstacles to trade which leads to income convergence, rather than just the
similarity suggested by the Linder hypothesis.

There is an extensive literature about the extent of income convergence among countries.
This literature, however, is mostly based on models that determine the existence and magnitude
of convergence through the common cross-country growth regressions. The primary methodology
used to test for the existence of convergence in these studies was to regress growth rates on initial
levels of income plus the additional factors that one wished to control for. A negative relationship
between the rates of growth and the initial incomes was interpreted as implying convergence. In
Chapter 3, however, convergence will be characterized by the reduction in income differentials
within specific groups of countries over time.

Another difference between this research and the earlier papers is that the primary focus
here is on intra-industry trade’s relationship to the convergence process. Trade groups are formed
on the basis of intra-industry trade among countries rather than only exports or imports. No
attempt is made to analyze and extend the theoretical motivations behind the relationship between
intra-industry trade and income convergence. The contribution of this research is by empirically
noting the existence of such a link.

5

The 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries are included in the
analysis with per capita incomes of $10,000 or higher in 2002. For each country, primary intraindustry trade partners are determined and trade groups are created. The behavior of income
differentials within these groups is examined. The majority of these intra-industry trade-based
groups exhibited significant income convergence. The hypotheses are tested to examine whether
any random grouping of these same countries might produce similar results, whether the
convergence within groups might be towards one country that is common to most of the groups,
and whether the tendency towards convergence is considerably stronger when the basis for
constructing groups is trade rather than proximity or common language.

The results show that significant income convergence is not a common outcome among
countries when they are grouped randomly instead of grouping them according to their trade
partners; the convergence within groups is not towards one country that is common to most of the
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of the major
trade partners that are members in most of the groups, and the tendency towards convergence
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than
proximity or common language.

Chapter 4 of the dissertation relates to the determinants of the intra-industry trade in a
multi-country & multi-industry framework. One group of models that has emerged through the
synthesis of international economics and industrial organization includes the models of intraindustry trade. Intra-industry trade models provide an explanation for the simultaneous export and
import of fairly similar goods. In these models countries’ markets are characterized by imperfect
competition involving differentiated products and increasing returns to scale. The opening of
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trade results in a greater product variety and an increased competition with a consequent
reduction in costs and prices. In their pioneering study which fundamentally changed the way
economists view the causes of international trade, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) established the extent
of intra-industry trade in different industrial nations, considered some measurement issues, and
investigated possible causes and consequences of such trade. To point out this fundamental
change, Helpman and Krugman (1989) refer to intra-industry trade as “one of the key empirical
reasons for emphasizing the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition in the world
economy” (Helpman and Krugman , 1989: p.133).

Greenaway and Milner (1986) have surveyed the literature on the testing of hypotheses
concerning intra-industry trade. They suggest that the hypotheses can be classified in three
groups. The first group of studies identifies country-specific characteristics that influence the
extent of intra-industry trade2. The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is
positively correlated with country characteristics. The general consistency of the signs and the
significance levels of the coefficients give support for the country-specific hypotheses.

The second group of studies has emphasized industry-specific determinants of intraindustry trade relating to scale economies, product differentiation, and imperfect competition3.
Greenaway and Milner conclude that there are some systematic inter-industry characteristics of
intra-industry trade, and varying degrees of support for the hypotheses, but country characteristics
seem to be more important than industry characteristics in explaining intra-industry trade.

2

Loertscher and Wolter (1980), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Balassa (1986), and Globerman and Dean
(1990).
3
Culem and Lundberg (1983), Greenaway and Milner (1984), Balassa (1986), Marvel and Ray (1987), Ray
(1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Lundberg (1992), and Clark (1993).
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The final group of empirical studies analyzed policy-based hypotheses relating to tariffs,
non-tariff barriers, and economic integration4. Greenaway and Milner conclude that there is no
consistent empirical evidence that variations in intra-industry trade can be explained by policy
interventions.

A more recent study is Kim and Oh (2001). From the cross-sectional analysis using 19701994 data, results are obtained that support the following three empirical hypotheses: The share
of intra-industry trade will be large: (a) if the two economies are of similar size, (b) if the capitallabor endowment ratio of both countries is similar, and (c) if the total size of the two economies is
large.

In the literature, one group of authors has concentrated on the measurement of intraindustry trade. Another group has taken econometric approaches and attempted to test the theory
of intra-industry trade with data on an observed country or a group of countries. This research
belongs to the second group. This study provides recent evidence on determinants of the intraindustry trade in a multi-country & multi-industry framework. Bilateral trade data of 1998-2002
period at three-digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) industry groups are used
for 24 developed countries.

First, a theoretical summary of a two-country model based on product differentiation and
economies of scale will be provided, following Helpman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985). Then, using this model, the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade are analyzed in
the trade of each country with every other country in each industry category. Some hypotheses

4

Balassa (1986), Bergstrand (1983), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Toh (1982), Caves (1981), and
Loertscher and Wolter (1980).
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that are tested in this study investigate the effect of the following country characteristics on the
bilateral intra-industry trade: average per capita income, average country size, income and size
difference, distance, common border, trade orientation, participation in economic integration
systems and common language.

Trade data of 2002 for 24 developed countries are included in the analysis with per capita
incomes of $10, 000 or higher. In the order of decreasing per capita GNP, these countries are
Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France, Australia, Italy,
Israel, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece. The investigation covers 44 three-digit
industry groups which belong to Section 7 of the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) system.

The hypotheses put forward in the theoretical literature in regard to common country
characteristics are generally confirmed by the empirical results. Thus, the extent of intra-industry
trade is positively correlated with average income levels, average country size, and the existence
of common borders and it is negatively correlated with income inequality, inequality in country
size, and distance. All the variables are highly significant.

We also found that the extent of intra-industry trade and participation in the EU, and the
NAFTA are positively correlated, with all the coefficients being highly significant in the relevant
equations. Also, the language variables have the expected positive sign whenever they are
statistically significant, which is the case in most instances.

9

Chapter 2. Export Subsidies, Countervailing Tariffs and
Managerial Incentives in Strategic Trade Policy Games
1 Introduction
International trade has grown rapidly in the last decades. Reductions in tariffs and improvements
in communication have lowered the costs of importing goods produced in other countries.
Moreover, new producers are emerging as developing countries industrialize. As a result,
producers in developed countries are facing increased competition from foreign producers. As an
example, for many years export promotion was a large issue in Japanese government policy.
Government officials recognized that Japan needed to import to grow and develop, and it needed
to generate exports to pay for those imports. Japan’s methods of promoting exports have taken
two paths. The first was to develop world-class industries that can initially substitute for imports
and then compete in international markets. The second was to provide incentives for firms to
export. The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of policies to restrain exports in certain
industries. The great success of some Japanese export industries created a reaction in other
countries. Under GATT guidelines, nations have been reluctant to raise tariffs or impose import
quotas. Instead, they have tried to convincing the exporting country to “voluntarily” restrain
exports of the offending product. In the 1980s, Japan was quite willing to carry out such export
restraints. Among Japan’s exports to the Unites States, steel, color television sets, and
automobiles all were subjects to such restraints at various times.

While there are many reasons for the current challenges facing American-owned auto
manufacturers, Japan’s trade policies and the impact of Japan’s sustained currency manipulation
stand out among the primary causes. With the progressive lowering of tariffs and other barriers to
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trade, exchange rates have taken on a larger component of competitive advantage. This subsidy
has both facilitated the expansion of Japanese companies in the U.S. and succeeded in keeping
American-built automobiles out of Japan. In 2004, the U.S.-Japan bilateral automotive trade
deficit reached $44.2 billion, making it the largest sectoral trade deficit the United States
maintains with any country. In 2004, automotive trade represented over two-thirds of the total
U.S.-Japan deficit.

The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are often violated in
the real world. Traditional trade theory based on perfect competition does not effectively explain
phenomena such as intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade between similar countries.
Moreover, such models failed to successfully integrate some important policy related
considerations, such as increasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing, R&D, and inter-firm
strategic rivalries. Effective analysis of these topics requires imperfect competition, which
together with increasing returns to scale is one of the main characteristics of many of today’s
industries, especially of those in the industrialized countries. As new theories of imperfectly
competitive markets have developed, game-theoretic approach of strategic trade policy began to
emerge in the early 1980’s.

As a strategic trade policy instrument, an export subsidy used by the foreign government
could be “countervailed” by a domestic import tariff. The interesting point about these
countervailing effects is that they do not eliminate incentives to use active strategic trade policy,
and the policy equilibrium normally implies positive subsidies and tariffs. Collie (1994) examines
a country’s optimal response to foreign export subsides. In his model, the home government uses
an import tariff to extract rents from the foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the
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domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy
to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. He shows that the unique equilibrium
sequence of moves of the governments is that the home government announces its trade policy
before the foreign government does.

It may be of a particular interest to integrate the strategic trade policy with the
hierarchical games in firm theory. Traditional economic theory considers firms as economic
agents with the single objective of profit maximization. Some have criticized this as being
simplistic, arguing that real firms may have a different goal. Several theories have suggested that
large firms are more concerned with maximizing revenues or market shares rather than profits.
Recent advances in international trade theory emphasize strategic behavior among firms of
different countries and its implication for trade policy. With the separation of ownership,
management, and workers various incentive structures exist within a modern corporation. In order
to correctly assess the policy intervention in international trade, it is important to understand how
trade policies affect intra-firm incentives and vice versa.

It is generally argued that a proper analysis of the firm’s objective function should be
based on the analysis of the owner-manager relationship. A manager’s objective depends on the
structure of the incentives that his owner sets to motivate him. Owners often index managerial
compensation to profits, sales, output, quality, and some other variables. Even if the owners want
to maximize profits, the incentive system they design may imply managerial incentives which are
different from profit maximization. The principal (firm owner) can distort the incentives of his
agents (firm managers) in order to affect the outcome of the competition between his agent and
competing agents. In general, the owner of a firm will adjust his managers’ incentives in such a
way that it will cause rival agents to change their behavior in favor of that firm.

12

Sklivas (1987) addresses the question of whether firms with separate owners and
managers maximize profits. He examines an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or
prices, as in the Cournot or Bertrand models, and owners choose their managers’ incentives.
Owner evaluates his manager’s performance according to a measure, which is a linear
combination of his firm’s profits and revenues. The higher is this measure, the higher is the
manager’s payment. When managers compete in quantities, firms in the owner-manager game
produce outputs greater than the output in the standard5 Cournot model. This results in firms’
having lower profits than the profit-maximizing firms in the standard Cournot model. When
managers compete in prices, firms receive higher profits than in the standard Bertrand model.

One aspect of managerial incentives analyzed in the principal-agent literature is the
strategic delegation of price and quantity fixing decisions. Strategic delegation refers to the
design of an incentive payment scheme to the manager, independent of considerations like moral
hazard or adverse selection. If a duopoly market consists of a profit-maximizing firm and a firm
in the administration of a manager who is instructed to maximize sales, the second firm may earn
higher profits even when both firms face the same cost function. Hence there is an incentive to set
up a non-profit maximizing objective for the manager6.

This paper is concerned with strategic managerial delegation and its implications for
international trade policy. Corporate firms, with separation of management and ownership,
compete in international markets. We ask how trade policy affects the incentive to managers,
which in turn affects the impact of trade policy on prices and quantities. Our paper combines the
models of Collie (1994) and Sklivas (1987) in a single integrated analytical framework. The

5
6

In the standard Cournot or Bertrand model, ownership and management are not separated for each firm.
See Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Katz (1991).
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integrated model will have a modest contribution to the literature by investigating the strategic
trade policies under duopoly in a multistage game with endogenous timing of trade policy when
the ownership and the management are separated for each firm.

In what follows, trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade
policy decisions is endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign
governments independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or
at stage two. Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its
national welfare. The home government uses an import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm
and a production subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The
foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm.
If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then
the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. If the home [foreign] government
chooses to move at stage one and the foreign [home] government chooses to move at stage two,
then the outcome will be a Stackelberg game where the home [foreign] government is the
Stackelberg leader. At stage three the owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts
with their managers that specify how they will be rewarded. Finally, the managers will
simultaneously choose their firms’ outputs. The appropriate solution for this multistage game is
the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained by applying the Nash equilibrium to all the
stages of the game by the process of backward induction.

The results show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the
home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government
sets its export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government
commits itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the
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simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export
subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries
are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move
game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country
gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that
imperfect competition does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the
home country should commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie
(1994), our results show that home and foreign welfares are higher, home firm’s profits are lower,
and foreign firm’s profits are higher in each of the three games, i.e. simultaneous-move trade
policy game, Stackelberg game when the home government is the Stackelberg leader, and
Stackelberg game when the foreign government is the Stackelberg leader.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Imperfect Competition and International Trade:
Emergence of the Strategic Trade Policies
The inclusion of models of imperfect competition into the international trade theory has been one
of the most important developments in the economic theory during the 1980’s. Some of the
principal research areas of this literature are as follows:

First is the relation between trade policy and the market power of domestic firms. Many
economists have noted that international trade reduces the market power of domestic firms, and
argued that protection increases domestic market power. Bhagwati (1965) firstly and then
Krishna (1984) comprehensively demonstrated that the effects of protection depend on the form it
takes - specifically, quantitative restrictions such as import quotas create more domestic market
power than tariffs.

Second is the role of price discrimination and “dumping” in international markets. A
duopoly model of dumping was developed by Brander (1981) and analyzed fully by Brander and
Krugman (1983). In a perfectly symmetrical situation with the complete absence of comparative
advantage, it is shown that if the transport costs are not too large and if the firms behave in a
Cournot fashion, trade will nevertheless result, as long as price subtracted by transportation cost
exceeds marginal cost.

A third research area is the industry structure that is most open to analysis, which is the
monopolistic competition. This has been analyzed in detail by Krugman (1979), Lancaster
(1980), Helpman (1981), and many others. The particular importance of this analysis is the
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difference it shows between intra-industry trade, based on product diversity and increasing
returns to scale, and inter-industry trade, explained by the factor endowment considerations.

Another research area attempts to explore the possibility that government action can
serve a “strategic” role in giving domestic firms an advantage in oligopolistic competition by
shifting oligopoly rents from foreign to domestic firms. The starting point of this debate was
several papers by Brander and Spencer (1981, 1983, and 1985). One of the pioneering models of
Brander and Spencer, which made the main contribution to the emergence of the literature on
strategic trade policies, will be examined in the next subsection.

The basic idea of strategic trade policy to shift rents has been criticized from many points
of view7. First, the policy implications are highly sensitive to the changes in the specific
assumptions of the model. Second, policymakers must consider general equilibrium effects
because industries compete for scarce special factors within a country. Third, rent-shifting by
governments will probably cause rent-seeking activities by private agents that are not generally
consistent with the interests of the society.

2.2 The Pioneering Brander and Spencer (1985) Model
Perhaps the most robust finding in the analysis of strategic trade policy is that imperfect
competition of the oligopoly type almost always creates clear incentives for government
intervention - “...government intervention can raise national welfare by shifting oligopoly rents
from foreign to domestic firms...(and therefore) government policies can serve the “strategic”

7

For a survey of these criticisms, see Helpman and Krugman (1989).
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purpose of altering the subsequent incentives of firms, acting as a deterrent to foreign
competitors” (Krugman, 1989: p.1201).

The idea of profit shifting can be explained most easily with reference to the BranderSpencer (1985) model in which a domestic government decides in the first stage on a linear
export subsidy and, in the second stage, a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in quantities
on a third market. In the absence of government intervention, the equilibrium in the BranderSpencer model corresponds to the Cournot (Nash) solution. Then one government decides to give
an export subsidy to let its firm to produce the output that corresponds to the Stackelberg leader
position. As a result the total amount of sales increases, the leading country’s total profit
increases; meanwhile, the follower’s profit is reduced because the follower sells a lower amount
than it would without the intervention. Even without intervention, each duopolist would have an
incentive to take the position of a Stackelberg leader if its rival were satisfied to act as a follower,
but moving from a Cournot equilibrium to a leadership position is not considered a “credible
choice” for either firm. In the presence of government intervention, however, an expansion of the
subsidized firm’s output is regarded as a credible choice by its rival because an expansion would
be privately profitable even if the rival would not reduce its output. “A subsidy to the cost of
producing extra output makes it in the firm’s interest to expand output, even taking the other
firm’s output as given. Therefore the firm’s expansion of output is credible. The rival firm can
best respond by contracting output” (Brander, 1986: p.28).

The Brander-Spencer analysis of shifting rents has been criticized from many viewpoints.
First is the dependence of trade policy recommendations on the nature of competition between
firms, analyzed by Eaton and Grossman (1986). They show that the Brander-Spencer argument
for export subsidies depends on the assumption of Cournot competition and that replacing the
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Cournot with Bertrand assumption reverses the policy recommendation; for the home firm to
increase its profits, the government has to impose not an export subsidy, but an export tax.

Second, policy-makers must consider general equilibrium effects because industries
compete for scarce special factors within a country. This objection has been presented by Dixit
and Grossman (1984). In general equilibrium, an export industry can expand only by taking
resources away from other domestic industries. So an export subsidy, while it lowers the marginal
cost in the targeted industry, will raise marginal cost in other sectors. Thus, in industries that are
not targeted the effect will be the reverse of deterrence.

Third, the extent for raising national income through strategic trade policies is negligible.
This argument, developed by Dixit (1984), rests on potential competition through entry. An
industry in which firms earn profits will be attractive to new entrants and if entry actually takes
place, increased competition will limit or eliminate the profits of the subsidizing country.

Finally, the Brander-Spencer analysis assumes that the government can commit itself to a
trade policy before firms make their decisions. They also do not consider the possible reactions of
foreign governments. However, firms also make strategic moves to affect government decisions
and governments must consider the possibility of foreign reactions. Many of these models have
been analyzed by Dixit and Kyle (1985).

2.3 Countervailing Tariffs: The model of Collie (1994)
Much of the literature of strategic trade policy assumes the sequence of moves of rival
governments as exogenously given. For example, Collie (1991) examines the optimal export
subsidy set by a foreign government when a home government responds to a foreign export
subsidy with a home import tariff. In his model, the foreign government is exogenously assigned
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the role of a Stackelberg leader and the home government the role of a Stackelberg follower. He
finds that the optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is to retaliate with a partial
countervailing tariff and the extent of countervailing is sufficient in most cases to eliminate the
foreign country’s incentive to use an export subsidy.

To correct the modeling problem of exogenously given sequence of moves of the
governments, Collie (1994) extends his earlier work by allowing the timing of trade policy
decisions to be endogenous. The home government uses an import tariff to extract rent from the
foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect
competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm
to the foreign firm. The results of Collie (1994) show that the home government setting trade
policy at stage one and the foreign government setting trade policy at stage two is the Nash
equilibrium. Both countries are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader.
An immediate conclusion is that imperfect competition cannot explain the existence of
countervailing duties since the home government commits not to use them in equilibrium.

2.4 The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives
Economists have long considered the objective function of large corporations. Several theories
argue that in the firms with separate owners and managers, the interests of managers - their
income, status, power, security, etc. – lie partly with sales and growth rather than purely with
profits. Agency theory, going back to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom (1979), and many
other related papers, suggests that, if the objective function of the manager is different from the
objective function of the owner, one may observe behavior that deviates from profit
maximization. For example, managers may have a strategy of diversification to increase their job
security or to assure the long-run survival of the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Donaldson and
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Lorsch, 1983). Managers may want to secure their positions by choosing irreversible projects that
require expertise owned by only the current management (Schleifer and Vishny, 1989). Kedia
(2002) finds empirical support for the idea that top management compensation is related to sales
maximization in an oligopoly setting.

Fershtman and Judd (1987) model a case where owners who are interested in profit
maximization may find it optimal to include sales maximization in the manager’s objective
function in an oligopoly setting. The nature of the optimal incentive structure critically depends
on the nature of oligopolistic competition. In the case of Cournot quantity competition, Fershtman
and Judd (1987) prove that each owner wants to motivate his manager toward high production in
order to get rival managers to reduce their output. Therefore, in equilibrium, owners will give a
positive incentive for sales. On the other hand, if firms compete in price, each owner wants his
manager to set a high price, encouraging rival managers to also raise their prices. Therefore, with
price competition, owners will pay managers to keep sales low.

Sklivas (1987) shows that the separation of ownership and management gives the owners
the opportunity to commit their managers to non-profit-maximizing behavior. When managers
compete in quantities, firms in the owner-manager game act as profit maximizers with less than
true cost. They produce outputs greater than the Cournot output. This results in firms’ having
lower profits than the profit-maximizing firms in the standard Cournot model. When managers
compete in prices, the consequences of the separation of ownership and management reverse;
firms act as profit maximizers with greater than true cost, with the result that prices are higher.
Firms also receive higher profits than in the standard Bertrand model.
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3 The Model
There are two countries in the model: the home and the foreign country. Home country variables
are denoted by the subscript 1 and foreign country variables by the subscript 2. The industry that
is analyzed is a Cournot duopoly with one firm in each country, and the home and foreign
markets are assumed to be segmented. Each firm has one owner and one manager. The home and
foreign firms have constant marginal costs c1 and c2, respectively. With segmented markets and
constant marginal cost, the home market can be analyzed independently of the foreign market.
The home firm produces x1 for the home market and the foreign firm exports x2 to the home
market, hence total sales in the home market are X = x1 + x2. Price in the home market is given by
the linear inverse demand function P = a − bX. While the home government uses a specific
import tariff of t per unit and a production subsidy of s per unit, the foreign government uses an
export subsidy of e per unit.

Trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade policy decisions is
endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign governments
independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or at stage two.
Once they have chosen when to set trade policy their decisions become common knowledge and
they are committed to this timing of moves in the game. Then, at the chosen stage, each
government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare. The home government uses an
import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm and a production subsidy to correct the domestic
distortion due to imperfect competition. The foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift
profits from the home firm to the foreign firm. If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set
trade policy at the same stage of the game, then the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade
policy game. If the home [foreign] government chooses to move at stage one and the foreign
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[home] government chooses to move at stage two, then the outcome will be a Stackelberg game
where the home [foreign] government is the Stackelberg leader. At stage three the owners will
simultaneously write and announce contracts with their managers that specify how they will be
rewarded. Finally, the managers will simultaneously choose their firms’ outputs. The appropriate
solution for this multistage game is the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained by
applying the Nash equilibrium to all the stages of the game by the process of backward induction.

Owner i measures his manager’s performance according to some function of his firm’s
profits (Πi) and revenues (Ri), which are observed indicators of performance. We call this
measure gi, i = 1,2. The higher is gi, the higher is manager i’s bonus. Because firm i’s output, xi,
does not enter manager i’s utility directly, the owner links the manager’s reward to xi (as well as
to xj) through a function of gi. So, let Ai + Bi gi(.,.) represent manager i’s incentives, where Ai and
Bi are nonnegative reals. For simplicity, we make gi a linear combination of profits and revenues:
gi = λi Πi(x1, x2) + (1 - λi) Ri(x1, x2)
= Ri(x1, x2) - λi Ci(xi), i = 1, 2, where
Ci(xi) = ci xi
Π1(x1, x2) = (P - c1 + s) x1

Π2(x1, x2) = (P − c2 – t + e) x2

R1(x1, x2) = (P + s) x1

R2(x1, x2) = (P – t + e) x2

The owner i has full information about his manager’s costs and actions. The owner’s goal
is simply to determine what action he wants the manager to choose, and to design an incentive
payment to induce the manager to choose that action. For the owner i’s choice of λi , let xi(λi,λ*j)
denote the action that manager i can take, given owner j’s choice of λ*j and manager j’s choice of
x*j. The problem, from the viewpoint of owner i, of determining λi and designing the optimal
incentive scheme Ai + Bi gi(.,.) can be written as
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max Πi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )) – (Ai + Bi gi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )))

λi , A i , Bi

such that Ai + Bi gi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )) ≥ w0,i
Ai + Bi gi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )) ≥ Ai+Bi gi ( x1 ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j ))

(1)
(2)

where w0,i denotes the reservation wage of manager i.

Condition (1) imposes the constraint that each manager must receive at least his
reservation wage since one possible “action” is not to participate; this is the participation
constraint. To minimize the salary of his manager, as it is a loss term in the objective function of
the owner, the owner i must then equate it to the reservation wage w0,i .

Condition (2) imposes the constraint that the manager i will find it optimal to
choose xi* ( λi , λ*j ); this is the incentive compatibility constraint. As we are going to define in
Section 3.1, xi* that enters into the objective function of owner i is actually the argument that
maximizes gi( xi , x *j ). Therefore, for any positive real Bi the incentive compatibility condition
will always be satisfied. Thus, the owner i can choose Bi arbitrarily small, as long as it is positive.
Then Ai can, in effect, be chosen to be arbitrarily close to wo,i and the objective function of
owner i will be arbitrarily close to Πi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )) – w0,i . Normalizing w0,i to zero
for simplicity, we will hereafter assume, as in Sklivas (1987), that the problem of owner i is to
maximize Πi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )) over λi whereas the problem of manager i is to maximize
gi( xi ( λi , λ*j ), x *j ( λi , λ*j )) over xi.
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3.1 Stage 3: Managers choose their firms’ outputs
The firms simultaneously and independently choose their outputs to maximize gi given s, t, e, λ1,
and λ2.
Definition: ( x1* , x 2* ) is a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame if and only if

xi* = argmax gi( xi , x *j ), i,j = 1,2, i ≠ j.
g1 = (P + s) x1 − λ1 c1 x1
= (a − b(x1 + x2) + s) x1 − λ1 c1 x1
g2 = (P – t + e) x2 − λ2 c2 x2
= (a − b(x1 + x2) – t + e) x2 − λ2 c2 x2
Assuming the home market is supplied by both home production and imports, the first-order
conditions for a Cournot equilibrium are:

∂g1
= a − b(x1 + x2) + s − bx1 - λ1 c1 = 0
∂x1

(3)

∂g 2
= a − b(x1 + x2) - t + e – bx2 – λ2 c2 = 0
∂x 2

(4)

Hence we find manager i’s best-response function, φi ( x j ; λi ) , by maximizing gi(.) over xi. As λi
is decreased, costs are weighted less, and φi (.) shifts out. So, decreasing λi commits manager i to
more “aggressive” behavior, i.e. for every xj, manager i responds with a greater xi:

x1 =

a − bx 2 + s − λ1c1
= φ1 ( x 2 ; λ1 )
2b

x2 =

a − bx1 − t + e − λ 2 c 2
= φ 2 ( x1 ; λ 2 )
2b
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Solving Eqs. (3) and (4) simultaneously, we get the Nash equilibrium quantities and price as:

x1 =

1 a + 2s − 2λ1c 1 +t − e + λ2 c 2
3
b

x2 =

1 a − s + λ1c1 − 2t + 2e − 2λ 2 c 2
b
3

P=

1
( a + t − s − e + λ1c 1 + λ2 c 2 )
3

(5)

Notice that as the owner i makes his manager more aggressive by decreasing λi, his own firm’s
output increases, while his rival’s decrease in equilibrium.

3.2 Stage 2: Owners choose their managers’ incentives8
The owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts with their managers that specify
how they will be rewarded.
Definition: ( λ1* , λ*2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in the owners’ subgame if and only if

λ*i = argmax Πi ( x1* ( λi , λ*j ), x 2* ( λi , λ*j )), i,j = 1,2, i ≠ j.
Π1(x1, x2) = (P - c1 + s) x1

∂
Π1(x1, x2) = 0
∂λ1
⇒ bx1 - 2(P - c1 + s) = 0

(6)

Π2(x1, x2) = (P – c2 – t + e) x2

∂
Π2(x1, x2) = 0
∂λ 2
⇒ bx2 - 2(P – c2 - t + e) = 0

8

(7)

To see some of the calculations in detail, see Appendix.
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Using the Nash equilibrium quantities and price in (5) and solving Eqs. (6) and (7)
simultaneously, we get λ1* and λ*2 as:

λ1* =

1 − a − 3s − 2t + 2e − 2c 2 + 8c1
5
c1

λ*2 =

1 − a + 2 s + 3t − 3e + 8c 2 − 2c1
5
c2

We show in the subsections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 that at the equilibrium we have λ1* < 1 and

λ*2 < 1 . Substituting λ1*

and λ*2 above into (5), we get

x1 =

2 a + 3s + 2t − 2e + 2c 2 − 3c1
5
b

x2 =

2 a − 2 s − 3t + 3e − 3c 2 + 2c1
5
b

P=

2
a
(c1 + c2 + t − s − e + )
5
2

(8)

Why do firms choose at the equilibrium λ1* < 1 , λ2 < 1 and not λ1* = 1 , λ*2 = 1 ? To show
*

this, let us assume, without loss of the generality, that s = t = e = 0 . Now, if λ1 = 1 and λ 2 = 1 ,
then both firms will maximize their profits and the result will be a Cournot outcome. The first
order conditions for this Cournot equilibrium will give:

x1 =

1 a − 2c1 + c 2
,
3
b

x2 =

1 a + c1 − 2c 2
,
3
b

1 (a − 2c1 + c 2 ) 2
1 (a + c1 − 2c 2 ) 2
, Π2 =
Π1 =
b
b
9
9
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1
P = (a + c1 + c 2 )
3

Now, given the second firm sets λ 2 = 1 and maximizes its profits, it is a better strategy for firm 1
to decrease its costs c1 so that its output and profit increase. This follows from

dx1
dΠ 1
< 0,
<0.
dc1
dc1
For firm 1 to decrease its costs, the owner lets his manager maximize a linear
combination of profits and revenues. Then, in the objective function of the manager, the cost term
is not c1 any more, but it is λ1 c1 , i.e.
g1 = R1(x1, x2) – λ1 c1 x1, where λ1 < 1 .
But then, if the manager of firm 2 continues to operate with c2 choosing λ 2 = 1 , firm 1 would
have a “cost advantage” and increase its profits while the profits of firm 2 would decrease. In
other words, firm 1’s unilateral deviation from profit maximization increases its profits and
lowers firm 2’s. So then, the best response of firm 2 is to “decrease” its costs by choosing λ 2 < 1 ,
too.

Thus, in the owner-manager game, managers behave more aggressively than profit
maximizers, i.e. λ1* < 1 and

λ*2 < 1 . This results in outputs that are higher than in the Cournot

model, xi* (λ1* , λ*2 ) > xi* (1,1) , i=1,2. Setting s=t=e=0 and c1 = c 2 = c , from Eq.(5) and Eq.(8), we
see that

x1* (λ1* , λ*2 ) =

2 a−c 1 a−c
>
= x1* (1,1)
5 b
3 b

x 2* (λ1* , λ*2 ) =

2 a−c 1 a−c
>
= x 2* (1,1)
5 b
3 b
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The intuition for the result of the owners’ committing their managers to non-profit
maximizing behavior can be also seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates the Cournot outcome, C;
and the outcome of the owner-manager game, M. In choosing λ i , an owner implicitly chooses his
manager’s best-response function, so we can think of owners as playing a game in best response
functions. Starting from point C, the Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame resulting
from λ1 = 1 and λ 2 = 1 , owner 1 can increase his profits by decreasing λ1 , which shifts

φ1 ( x2 ; λ1 = 1) out to φ1 ( x2 ; λ1 = λ1* ) . By committing his manager to more aggressive behavior,
owner 1 moves the equilibrium quantities down along φ 2 ( x1 ; λ2 = 1) to point T, and so increases

x1* and decreases x 2* . This increases owner 1’s profits9.

So, λ1 = 1 cannot be a best response to λ 2 = 1 and point C, where both owners’
committing their managers to profit-maximizing behavior cannot be an equilibrium. But
then, λ 2 = 1 is not a best response to λ1 = λ1* either, since by decreasing λ 2 and shifting

φ 2 ( x1 ; λ2 = 1) out to φ 2 ( x1 ; λ2 = λ*2 ) , owner 2 can increase his profits. So, point T is not an
equilibrium, either. One can see that λ1* is a best response to λ*2 by the fact that firm 1’s isoprofit
*
curve is tangent to φ 2 ( x1 ; λ2 = λ2 ) at M, and similarly that λ*2 is a best response to λ1* by the fact
*
that firm 2’s isoprofit curve is tangent to φ1 ( x 2 ; λ1 = λ1 ) at M.

9

Note that profits increase as the isoprofit curves approach to the origin; since, for example, for a fixed

x1 value, if we decrease x 2 - that is, if we go down and approach to x1 axis – the price will increase, since
P = a – b(x1 + x2) and thus the profits of the firm 1 will increase.
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3.3 Stage 1: Governments choose their trade policies10
Each government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare. The welfare of the home
country is given by the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government revenue.
Hence, home welfare is:
x18 + x28

W1 =

∫ (a − bQ)dQ − P( x

*
1

+ x 2* ) + ( P − c1 ) x1* + sx1* + tx 2* − sx1*

0

↑ ---------------CS------------- ↑ ↑ -------PS------ ↑ ↑ -GR- ↑
CS: Consumer Surplus, PS: Producer Surplus, GR: Government Revenue

⇒ W1 =

b *
( x1 + x 2* ) 2 + (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) x1* + tx 2*
2

(9)

The welfare of the foreign country is the profits of the foreign firm from exports less the export
subsidy payments. Hence, foreign welfare is:
W2 = ( P − c 2 − t ) x 2* + ex1* − ex1*

↑ -------- Π2------- ↑ ↑ ESP ↑
Π2: Profits of the foreign firm, ESP: Export subsidy payments

⇒ W2 = (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c 2 − t ) x 2*

(10)

To analyze stage zero of the game there are three possible outcomes to consider: the Nash
equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game; the Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when
the foreign government is the first mover; and the Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game
when the home government is the first mover.

10

To see some of the calculations in detail, see Appendix.
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3.3.1 Simultaneous-Move Trade Policy Game
If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then
the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. Both governments simultaneously
and independently choose their trade policy to maximize national welfares in (9) and (10). It will
be assumed that there is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both home
production and imports11. Differentiating (9) and (10) we get

∂W1
= 0 ⇒ − 2b( x1* + x 2* ) + 4( P − c1 ) + 2bx1* − 6t + 5bx 2* = 0
∂t

(11)

∂W1
= 0 ⇒ b( x1* + x 2* ) + 3( P − c1 ) − bx1* − 2t = 0
∂s

(12)

∂W2
= 0 ⇒ 3( P − c 2 − t ) − bx 2* = 0
∂e

(13)

Solving Eqs. (11), (12), and (13) simultaneously and using (8) we get

x1s =

1
(5a − 11c1 + 6c2 )
5b

x2s =

6
(c1 − c2 )
5b

P s = c1
ss =

1
(5a − 11c1 + 6c2 )
10

3
t s = (c1 − c2 )
5
1
e s = (c1 − c2 ) ,
5

11

This assumption will be valid if the foreign firm has a cost advantage, but not such a large cost
advantage that home production is not worthwhile.
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where the superscript S denotes the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move trade policy
game. Substituting the above into the formulas of λ1, λ2, Π1, Π2, W1, and W2 we get:

λ1 =

1 −5a + 21c1 − 6c2 12
<1
10
c1

λ2 = −

1 3c1 − 8c2
<1
5 c2

Π1 =

1
(5a − 11c1 + 6c2 ) 2
50b

Π2 =

18
(c1 − c2 ) 2
25b

W1s =

1
18
(a − c1 ) 2 +
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
25b

W2s =

12
(c1 − c2 ) 2
25b

The results of Collie (1994) model and our model in the simultaneous-move trade policy
game are compared in Table 1 in the Appendix. In the Nash equilibrium, the home government
uses a positive tariff and production subsidy, and the foreign government uses a positive export
subsidy. Price in the home market is equal to the marginal cost of the home firm, and the home
tariff is three times as large as the foreign export subsidy. In what follows, the variables of the
Collie (1994) model are denoted by the superscript C. Our results show that W1 ≥ W1C , W2 ≥ W2C ,
i.e. home and foreign welfares are higher; Π1 ≤ Π 1C , Π2 ≥ Π C2 , i.e. home firm’s profits are lower
and foreign firm’s profits are higher; x1 ≤ x 1C , x2 ≥ x C2 , i.e. home firm’s output is lower and
foreign firm’s exports are higher; and s ≤ sC, t ≤ tC, e ≤ eC, i.e. home government’s production
subsidy, import tariff, and foreign government’s export subsidy are lower.

12

To see why λ1 and λ2 are less than 1, see the Appendix.
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3.3.2 Stackelberg Game when the Foreign Government is the First Mover
If, at stage zero of the game, the foreign government decides to set its export subsidy at stage one
and the home government decides to set its tariff and production subsidy at stage two, then the
outcome will be a Stackelberg game with the foreign government as the Stackelberg leader. The
subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by first solving stage two for the optimal tariff and
production subsidy of the home government as a function of of the foreign export subsidy set at
stage one, and then using this solution to obtain the optimal foreign export subsidy. At stage two,
the home government sets its tariff and production subsidy to maximize home welfare (9) given
the foreign export subsidy. Assuming there is an interior solution, the first-order conditions for
welfare maximization are:

∂W1
= 0 ⇒ − 2b( x1* + x 2* ) + 4( P − c1 ) + 2bx1* − 6t + 5bx 2* = 0
∂t

(14)

∂W1
= 0 ⇒ b( x1* + x 2* ) + 3( P − c1 ) − bx1* − 2t = 0
∂s

(15)

Solving Eqs. (14) and (15) simultaneously and using (8) we get

1
x1 = (a − e − 2c1 + c2 )
b
1
x2 = (e + c1 − c2 )
b
P = c1

(16)

1
t = (e + c1 − c2 )
2
1
s = (a − e − 2c1 + c2 )
2
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At stage one the foreign government sets its export subsidy to maximize its national welfare,
realizing that its export subsidy will affect the optimal tariff and production subsidy set by the
home government at stage two. Using (16), we get
W2 =

1
((c1 − c2 ) 2 − e) 2
2b

∂W2
= 0 ⇒ eF = 0,
∂e

(17)

where the superscript F denotes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when
the foreign government is the first mover. Substituting (17) into (16) gives

1
x1F = (a − 2c1 + c2 )
b
1
x2F = (c1 − c2 )
b
P F = c1
1
t F = (c1 − c2 )
2
1
s F = (a − 2c1 + c2 )
2
Substituting the above into the formulas of λ1, λ2, Π1, Π2, W1, and W2 we get:

λ1 =

1 −a + 4c1 − c2 13
<1
2
c1

λ2 = −

Π1 =

1
(a − 2c1 + c2 ) 2
2b

Π2 =

W1F =

13

1
1
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
2b

1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b

W2F =

To see why λ1 and λ2 are less than 1, see the Appendix.
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1 c1 − 3c2
<1
2 c2

1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b

The results of Collie (1994) model and our model in the Stackelberg game when the foreign
government is the first mover are compared in Table 2 in the Appendix. When the foreign
government is the Stackelberg leader, the foreign government sets a zero export subsidy at stage
one because it realizes that the home government will retaliate with a countervailing duty at the
second stage, and as a result the home tariff is lower than in the simultaneous-move game. Price
in the home market is equal to the marginal cost of the home firm. When compared to those of
Collie (1994), our results show that W1 ≥ W1C , W2 ≥ W2C , i.e. home and foreign welfares are
higher; Π1 ≤ Π 1C , Π2 ≥ Π C2 , i.e. home firm’s profits are lower and foreign firm’s profits are
higher; x2 ≥ x C2 , i.e. foreign firm’s exports are higher; x1 ≤ x 1C , i.e. home firm’s output is lower if
3c1 − 2c2 ≥ a; and s ≤ sC, t = tC, e = eC, i.e. home government’s production subsidy is lower, home
government’s import tariff and foreign government’s export subsidy are equal to those in the
Collie (1994) model.

3.3.3 Stackelberg Game when the Home Government is the First Mover
If, at stage zero of the game, the home government decides to set its tariff and production subsidy
at stage one and the foreign government decides to set its export subsidy at stage two, then the
outcome will be a Stackelberg game with the home government as the Stackelberg leader. The
subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by first solving stage two for the optimal export subsidy
of the foreign government as a function of the home tariff and production subsidy set at stage one,
and then using this solution to obtain the optimal home tariff and production subsidy. At stage
two, the foreign government sets its export subsidy to maximize foreign welfare (8) given the
home tariff and production subsidy. Assuming there is an interior solution, the first-order
condition for welfare maximization is:

35

∂W2
= 0 ⇒ 3( P − c 2 − t ) − bx 2* = 0
∂e

(18)

Solving Eq. (18) and using (8), we get

x1 = -

x2 =

1 −a − 4 s − 3t + 4c 1 −3c2
3
b

1 a − 2 s − 3t λ1 + 2c 1 −3c 2
2
b
(19)

1
P = (a − 2 s + 3t + 2c 1 +3c 2 )
6
e=

1
(a − 2s − 3t + 2c 1 −3c 2 )
12

At stage one the home government sets its tariff and production subsidy to maximize its national
welfare, realizing that its tariff and production subsidy will affect the optimal export subsidy set
by the foreign government at stage two. Using (19), we get

W1 =

Solving

1
(68c12 − 84c1c 2 + 45c 22 − 52c1 a − 6c 2 a + 29a 2 + 28as + 30at − 28s 2
72b
− 60st − 40sc1 + 12 sc 2 − 63t 2 − 12tc1 − 18tc 2 )

∂W1
∂W1
=
= 0 we find
∂s
∂t

1
5
3
s H = (a − c1 + c2 )
2
2
2
(20)

1
t H = (c1 − c2 )
2
where the superscript H denotes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when
the home government is the first mover. Substituting (20) into (19) gives
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x1H =

1
(2a − 5c1 + 3c2 )
2b

x2H =

3
(c1 − c2 )
2b

P H = c1
1
e H = (c1 − c2 )
4
Substituting the above into the formulas of λ1, λ2, Π1, Π2, W1, and W2 we get:

λ1 =

1 −2a + 9c1 − 3c2 14
<1
4
c1

λ2 = −

1 3c1 − 7c2
<1
4
c2

Π1 =

1
(2a − 5c1 + 3c2 ) 2
8b

Π2 =

9
(c1 − c2 ) 2
8b

W1H =

1
3
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
4b

W2H =

3
(c1 − c2 ) 2
4b

The results of Collie (1994) model and our model in the Stackelberg game when the home
government is the first mover are compared in Table 3 in the Appendix. When the home
government is the Stackelberg leader, it is found to commit to a lower tariff and production
subsidy than in the simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use
a larger export subsidy. Price in the home market is equal to the marginal cost of the home firm.
When compared to those of Collie (1994), our results show that W1 ≥ W1C , W2 ≥ W2C , i.e. home

14

To see why λ1 and λ2 are less than 1, see the Appendix.
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and foreign welfares are higher; Π1 ≤ Π 1C , Π2 ≥ Π C2 , i.e. home firm’s profits are lower and
foreign firm’s profits are higher; x1 ≤ x 1C , x2 ≥ x C2 , i.e. home firm’s output is lower and foreign
firm’s exports are higher; and s ≤ sC, t = tC, e ≤ eC, i.e. home government’s production subsidy
and foreign government’s export subsidy are lower whereas home government’s import tariff is
equal to that in the Collie (1994) model.

3.3.4 The Timing of Trade Policy Decisions
At stage zero the two governments each independently and simultaneously choose whether to set
trade policy at stage one or at stage two. If both governments choose to set trade policy at the
same stage of the game, then the outcome will be the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move
game. If the home government sets trade policy at stage one and the foreign government sets
trade policy at stage two, then the outcome is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg
game when the home government is the Stackelberg leader. If the foreign government sets trade
policy at stage one and the home government sets trade policy at stage two, then the outcome is
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg game when the foreign government is the
Stackelberg leader. The payoff matrix for this game of timing is given in Table 4 in the
Appendix. The following proposition builds up on the result of Collie (1994). Collie had shown
that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home government sets its
tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at
stage two. In his paper, however, the ownership and management were not separated for each
firm and thus, the firms were just maximizing their profits.
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Proposition 1: When the ownership and the management are separated for each firm, in the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home government sets its tariff and
production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two.
Proof: The comparison of home welfares when the home government sets trade policy at stage
one with when it sets trade policy at stage two yields:

W1S - W1F =
=

W1H - W1S =
=

1
18
1
1
(a − c1 ) 2 +
(c1 − c2 ) 2 - ( (a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2 )
2b
25b
2b
2b
11
(c1 − c2 ) 2 ≥ 0
50b
1
3
1
18
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2 - ( (a − c1 ) 2 +
(c1 − c2 ) 2 )
2b
4b
2b
25b
3
(c1 − c2 ) 2 ≥ 0
100b

Whatever stage the foreign government sets its trade policy, home welfare is always higher if the
home government sets its trade policy at stage one rather than at stage two. Therefore, setting
trade policy at stage one is a dominant strategy for the home government, and hence it will
obviously set trade policy at stage one.

The comparison of foreign welfares when the foreign government sets trade policy at
stage one with when it sets trade policy at stage two yields:

W2S - W2H =

12
3
27
(c1 − c2 ) 2 (c1 − c2 ) 2 = (c1 − c2 ) 2 ≤ 0
25b
4b
100b

W2F - W2S =

1
12
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2 (c1 − c2 ) 2 =
(c1 − c2 ) 2 ≥ 0
2b
25b
50b
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If the home government sets trade policy at stage one, then foreign welfare is higher if
the foreign government sets trade policy at stage two rather than at stage one. Setting trade policy
at stage two is the foreign country’s optimal response to the home country setting trade policy at
stage one, and setting trade policy at stage one is the dominant strategy for the home country.
Therefore, the home government setting trade policy at stage one and the foreign government
setting trade policy at stage two is the Nash equilibrium of stage zero of the game. Q.E.D.

By setting trade policy at stage one the home government commits itself to a lower tariff
and production subsidy than in the simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign
government to use a larger export subsidy than in the simultaneous-move game. As a result both
countries are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the
simultaneous-move game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and
the foreign country gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy.

Proposition 2: When the ownership and the management are separated for each firm, in the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the welfares of both countries are higher
when compared to the case when ownership and the management are not separated.

Proof: This follows directly from the comparison of home and foreign welfares that we have
found and those in Collie (1994). In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game,
when the home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign
government sets its export subsidy at stage two, the welfares of the home and foreign countries
that we found are:
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W1 =

1
3
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
4b

W2 =

3
(c1 − c2 ) 2
4b

The corresponding values were found in Collie (1994) as:

W1C =

1
1
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
2b

W2C =

1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b

Comparing we get W1 ≥ W1C and W2 ≥ W2C . Q.E.D.
When compared to those of Collie (1994), our results show that both home and foreign
welfares are higher. The foreign country is better off since at the unchanged prices and tariff rate
the foreign firm can supply more to the domestic market. The home country is better off since its
increased imports raise tariff revenues without leading to any change in domestic consumers'
surplus or in domestic producer's surplus net of the production subsidy. To see this, notice first
that home welfare can be considered as the sum of three separate terms:
(i) the home consumers' surplus derived from the consumption of the good produced in the home
and foreign countries,
(ii) the home producer's surplus net of the production subsidy,
(iii) the import tariff revenue of the home country.
The total consumption of the good remains at the same level as in the Collie (1994)
model. Thus, the home consumers' surplus does not change. The home producer's surplus net of
the production subsidy stays at the same level as in the Collie (1994) model, despite the cut in the
domestic production since the price of the good in home country is still equal to the domestic
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marginal cost of production. The import tariff revenue of the home country increases as the
imports are higher than in the Collie model while there is no change in the tariff rate. So, the
increase in the welfare of the home country (as compared to the results in Collie (1994) paper)
arises from the increase in the level of imports. One should note that the separation of the
managerial incentives from those of the owners’ leads to a lower level of production subsidy,
which gives rise to a lower level of production for the domestic firm, and a higher level of
production for the foreign firm. As the domestic firm's surplus net of the production subsidy is
already zero in an equilibrium with the price level equalling the domestic marginal cost, it is not
suprising that the home country becomes better-off if the the share of the imports in the
unchanged total domestic consumption increases at the unchanged level of tariff rates.

On the other hand, the welfare of the foreign country can be considered as the foreign
firm's surplus (profit) net of the export subsidy. It is obvious that with the unchanged domestic
price and the domestic import tariff rate, the welfare of the foreign firm is higher with the
increased exports of the foreign country.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper strategic trade policy under duopoly is investigated in a multistage game model with
endogenous timing of trade policy and when the ownership and management are separated for
each firm. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign governments
independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or at stage two.
Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its national welfare.

In the next stage, home and foreign firms choose the (relevant determining parameter of)
objective functions of their managers in a Nash play. The objective functions are selected from
the class of functions that are convex linear combinations of profits and revenues. Such functions
can indeed be rewritten as revised profit functions with the cost of production being now scaled
by the weight of the profit term in the managerial objective function. In the last stage, managers
in the two countries choose, in Cournot play, the optimal output levels implied by their assigned
objective functions. It turns out that the firm in each country has an incentive to give positive
weight to the revenue term in its manager’s objective function if the manager of the rival country
is instructed to maximize its owner's profits. The competition between the firms then forces in
equilibrium each firm owner committing their managers to non-profit maximizing behavior.

It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the home
government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government sets its
export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government commits
itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneousmove game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export subsidy than in the
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries are better off when
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the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move game. The home
country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country gains from facing a
lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that imperfect competition
does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the home country should
commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie (1994), our results
show that when the ownership and the management are separated for each firm, in the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the welfares of both countries are higher.
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Appendix
Table 1. Comparison of Results in the
Simultaneous-Move Trade Policy Game

W1
W2
Π1
Π2
x1
x2
P
s
t
e

Collie (1994)

Our Model

1
4
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
9b
2
(c1 − c2 ) 2
9b
1
(3a − 5c1 + 2c2 ) 2
9b
4
(c1 − c2 ) 2
9b
1
(3a − 5c1 + 2c2 )
3b
2
(c1 − c2 )
3b

1
18
(a − c1 ) 2 +
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
25b
12
(c1 − c2 ) 2
25b
1
(5a − 11c1 + 6c2 ) 2
50b
18
(c1 − c2 ) 2
25b
1
(5a − 11c1 + 6c2 )
5b
6
(c1 − c2 )
5b

c1

c1

1
(3a − 5c1 + 2c2 )
3
2
(c1 − c2 )
3
1
(c1 − c2 )
3

1
(5a − 11c1 + 6c2 )
10
3
(c1 − c2 )
5
1
(c1 − c2 )
5
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Table 2. Comparison of Results in the Stackelberg Game
when the Foreign Government is the First Mover

W1
W2
Π1
Π2
x1
x2
P
s
t
e

Collie (1994)

Our Model

1
1
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
4b
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
4b
1
(2a − 3c1 + c2 ) 2
6b
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
6b
1
(2a − 3c1 + c2 )
3b
1
(c1 − c2 )
3b

1
1
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
2b
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
1
(a − 2c1 + c2 ) 2
2b
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
1
(a − 2c1 + c2 )
b
1
(c1 − c2 )
b

c1

c1

1
(2a − 3c1 + c2 )
2
1
(c1 − c2 )
2

1
(a − 2c1 + c2 )
2
1
(c1 − c2 )
2

0

0
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Table 3. Comparison of Results in the Stackelberg Game
when the Home Government is the First Mover
Collie (1994)

Our Model

1
1
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
2b
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
1
(a − 2c1 + c2 ) 2
b
1
(c1 − c2 ) 2
b
1
(a − 2c1 + c2 )
b
1
(c1 − c2 )
b

1
3
(a − c1 ) 2 + (c1 − c2 ) 2
2b
4b
3
(c1 − c2 ) 2
4b
1
(2a − 5c1 + 3c2 ) 2
8b
9
(c1 − c2 ) 2
8b
1
(2a − 5c1 + 3c2 )
2b
3
(c1 − c2 )
2b

P

c1

c1

s

a − 2c1 + c2

W1
W2
Π1
Π2
x1
x2

t
e

1
(2a − 5c1 + 3c2 )
4
1
(c1 − c2 )
2
1
(c1 − c2 )
4

1
(c1 − c2 )
2
1
(c1 − c2 )
2

Table 4. Payoff Matrix for Trade Policy Game
Foreign Government
Domestic Government

Stage One

Stage Two

Stage One

W1S , W2S

W1H , W2H

Stage Two

W1F , W2F

W1S , W2S
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3.2 Stage 2: Owners choose their managers’ incentives
Π1(x1, x2) = (P - c1 + s) x1

∂
[{P (.) − c1 + s} x1 (λ1 , λ 2 )] = 0
∂λ1
⇒

1
∂x
c1 x1 + ( P − c1 + s) 1 = 0
∂λ1
3

⇒

1
− 2c1
c1 x1 + ( P − c1 + s)(
) =0
3
3b

⇒ bx1 - 2(P - c1 + s) = 0

(6)

Π2(x1, x2) = (P – c2 – t + e) x2

∂
[{P(.) − c 2 − t + e} x 2 (λ1 , λ 2 )] = 0
∂λ 2
⇒

1
∂x
c2 x2 + ( P − c2 − t + e) 2 = 0
∂λ2
3

⇒

1
− 2c2
c2 x2 + ( P − c2 − t + e)(
) =0
3
3b

⇒ bx2 - 2(P – c2 - t + e) = 0

(7)

3.3 Stage 1: Governments choose their trade policies
x18 + x28

W1 =

∫ (a − bQ)dQ − P( x

*
1

+ x 2* ) + ( P − c1 ) x1* + sx1* + tx 2* − sx1*

0

↑ ---------------CS------------- ↑ ↑ -------PS------ ↑ ↑ -GR- ↑
CS: Consumer Surplus, PS: Producer Surplus, GR: Government Revenue
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b
W1 = a( x1* + x 2* ) − ( x1* + x 2* ) 2 − (a − b( x1* + x 2* ))( x1* + x 2* ) + (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) x1* + tx 2*
2
⇒ W1 =

b *
( x1 + x 2* ) 2 + (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) x1* + tx 2*
2

(9)

3.3.1 Simultaneous-Move Trade Policy Game:

∂W1
∂x1*
∂x 2*
∂ *
*
* ∂
*
*
*
*
*
*
= b( x1 + x 2 ) ( x1 + x 2 ) + (a − b( x1 + x 2 ) − c1 )
− b( ( x1 + x 2 )) x1 + t
+ x 2* = 0
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂W1
−2
4
−2 *
6
= b( x1* + x 2* )
+ (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) − b
x1 − t
+ x 2* = 0
∂t
5b
5b
5b
5b

⇒ − 2b( x1* + x 2* ) + 4( P − c1 ) + 2bx1* − 6t + 5bx 2* = 0

(11)

∂W1
∂x *
∂x *
∂
∂
= b( x1* + x 2* ) ( x1* + x 2* ) + ( a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) 1 − b( ( x1* + x 2* )) x1* + t 2 = 0
∂s
∂s
∂s
∂s
∂s
∂W1
2
6
2
4
= b( x1* + x 2* ) + (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) − b x1* − t
=0
∂s
5b
5b
5b
5b

⇒ b( x1* + x 2* ) + 3( P − c1 ) − bx1* − 2t = 0

(12)

∂W2
∂x *
∂
= ( a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c 2 − t ) 2 − b( ( x1* + x 2* )) x 2* = 0
∂e
∂e
∂e
∂W2
6
2
= (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c 2 − t ) − b x 2* = 0
∂e
5b
5b

⇒ 3( P − c 2 − t ) − bx 2* = 0

(13)

===========================================================
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To show that λ1 < 1 and λ 2 < 1 , we know that x1S > 0 and x 2S > 0 by the assumption that there
is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both domestic production and imports.

x1S > 0 ⇒ 5a − 11c1 + 6c2 > 0
⇒ − 5a < −11c1 + 6c2

Then, λ1 =

1 − 11c1 + 6c 2 + 21c1 − 6c 2
1 −5a + 21c1 − 6c2
<
= 1 , i.e. λ1 < 1
10
c1
10
c1

Similarly, x 2S > 0 ⇒ c1 − c 2 > 0 , i.e. c1 > c 2
Then, λ 2 = −

1 3c1 − 8c 2
1 3c 2 − 8c 2
<−
= 1 , i.e. λ 2 < 1
5
c2
5
c2

3.3.2 Stackelberg Game when the Foreign Government is the First Mover:
∂W1
∂x *
∂x *
∂
∂
= b( x1* + x 2* ) ( x1* + x 2* ) + ( a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) 1 − b( ( x1* + x 2* )) x1* + t 2 + x 2* = 0
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂t
∂W1
−2
4
−2 *
6
= b( x1* + x 2* )
+ (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) − b
x1 − t
+ x 2* = 0
∂t
5b
5b
5b
5b

⇒ − 2b( x1* + x 2* ) + 4( P − c1 ) + 2bx1* − 6t + 5bx 2* = 0

(14)

∂W1
∂x *
∂x *
∂
∂
= b( x1* + x 2* ) ( x1* + x 2* ) + ( a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) 1 − b( ( x1* + x 2* )) x1* + t 2 = 0
∂s
∂s
∂s
∂s
∂s
∂W1
2
6
2
4
= b( x1* + x 2* ) + (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c1 ) − b x1* − t
=0
∂s
5b
5b
5b
5b

⇒ b( x1* + x 2* ) + 3( P − c1 ) − bx1* − 2t = 0

(15)

===========================================================
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To show that λ1 < 1 and λ 2 < 1 , we know that x1S > 0 and x 2S > 0 by the assumption that there
is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both domestic production and imports.

x1F > 0 ⇒ a − 2c1 + c 2 > 0
⇒ −a − c2 < −2c1

Then, λ1 =

1 − a + 4c1 − c 2 1 4c1 − 2c1
<
= 1 , i.e. λ1 < 1
2
c1
2
c1

Similarly, x 2F > 0 ⇒ c1 − c 2 > 0 , i.e. c1 > c 2
Then, λ 2 = −

1 c1 − 3c 2
1 c − 3c 2
<− 2
= 1 , i.e. λ2 < 1
2 c2
2 c2

3.3.3 Stackelberg Game when the Home Government is the First Mover:
∂W2
∂x *
∂
= ( a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c 2 − t ) 2 − b( ( x1* + x 2* )) x 2* = 0
∂e
∂e
∂e
∂W2
6
2
= (a − b( x1* + x 2* ) − c 2 − t ) − b x 2* = 0
∂e
5b
5b

⇒ 3( P − c 2 − t ) − bx 2* = 0

(18)

===========================================================
To show that λ1 < 1 and λ 2 < 1 , we know that x1S > 0 and x 2S > 0 by the assumption that there
is an interior solution where the market is supplied by both domestic production and imports.

x1H > 0 ⇒ 2a − 5c1 + 3c 2 > 0 ⇒ −2a − 3c2 < −5c1
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Then, λ1 =

1 − 2a + 9c1 − 3c 2 1 − 5c1 + 9c1
<
= 1 , i.e. λ1 < 1
4
c1
4
c1

Similarly, x 2H > 0 ⇒ c1 − c 2 > 0 , i.e. c1 > c 2
Then, λ 2 = −

1 3c1 − 7c 2
1 3c 2 − 7c 2
<−
= 1 , i.e. λ2 < 1
4
c2
4
c2
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Chapter 3. Income Convergence & Intra-Industry Trade
1 Introduction
The subject of convergence of economic growth is one of the most important issues in modern
economics. In a world in which countries exchange goods, factors, and ideas; international
linkages are what drive any convergence process. Free trade in goods can equalize factor prices
across countries according to the factor-price-equalization theorem; international flows of factors
can lead to convergence of endowments and factor prices; and international flows of technology
can cause convergence of factor prices as well.

In neoclassical growth models a country’s per capita growth rate tends to be inversely
related to its starting level of per capita income. In particular, if countries are similar with respect
to structural parameters for preferences and technology, then poor countries tend to grow faster
than rich countries. That is, it is a prediction of neoclassical economic growth theory that
differences in per capita income across different economies will tend to decrease or disappear
over time. This is broadly referred to as the convergence hypothesis.

Though there is evidence of income convergence among some of the wealthy countries
(Baumol, 1986; Baumol et al., 1989), it is not obvious why some subsets of these countries
exhibit greater convergence than others, while other subsets of countries display no convergence
tendencies at all. This paper analyzes this issue from the perspective of trade’s contribution to the
process. It examines the relationship between international trade and income convergence among
countries by focusing on groups of countries forming major trade partners.
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In analyzing the factors that determine the extent of intra-industry trade in an inter-country
context, Linder (1961) advanced the hypothesis that the extent of trade in differentiated products
will be the greater, the more similar are income levels among the trading countries. This
hypothesis reflects the assumption that similarities in income levels are associated with
similarities in demand structures. The results of our paper are not sufficient to differentiate
between the hypothesis that countries that trade a great deal with one another tend to converge,
and the alternative hypothesis that similar countries tend to trade more. However, an analysis of
the relationship between trade liberalization and income convergence (Ben-David, 1993, 1994a)
suggests that it is trade liberalization that produces income convergence, rather than the other way
around. Although no intra-group income convergence was evident before the trade reforms,
significant convergence, together with significant increases in the volume of trade, began to occur
simultaneously with the removal of the trade barriers. These findings provide evidence that it is
the removal of obstacles to trade which leads to income convergence, rather than just the
similarity suggested by the Linder hypothesis.

There is an extensive literature about the extent of income convergence among countries.
This literature, however, is mostly based on models that determine the existence and magnitude
of convergence through the common cross-country growth regressions. The primary methodology
used to test for the existence of convergence in these studies was to regress growth rates on initial
levels of income plus the additional factors that one wished to control for. A negative relationship
between the rates of growth and the initial incomes was interpreted as implying convergence. In
our paper, however, convergence will be characterized by the reduction in income differentials
within specific groups of countries over time.
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Another difference between this paper and the earlier papers will be that the primary focus
here is on intra-industry trade’s relationship to the convergence process. Trade groups are formed
on the basis of intra-industry trade among countries rather than only exports or imports. No
attempt is made to analyze and extend the theoretical motivations behind the relationship between
intra-industry trade and income convergence. The contribution of this paper is by empirically
noting the existence of such a link. The results from this paper alone are not sufficient to
distinguish between the hypothesis that countries which (intra-industry) trade a great deal with
one another tend to converge, and the alternative hypothesis that similar countries tend to trade
more.15

The analysis includes the 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries16
with per capita incomes of $10,000 or higher in 2002. The first step is to determine each
country’s primary trade partners and to create trade groups using the intra-industry trade shares of
the total trade between countries. Having formed the trade groups, the behavior of each group’s
income differentials over time is examined for a significant evidence of convergence within them.
The results show that majority of these intra-industry trade-based groups exhibit significant
convergence. When the trade groups are formed according to the total trade between the countries
rather than intra-industry trade, we see a significant decrease in the number of the groups which
exhibit income convergence.

15

Ben-David (1993) and Ben-David (1994a) suggest that it is the trade which causes the countries to
converge in income, rather than the other way around.

16

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
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Then, the robustness and sensitivity of the results are examined from a number of
different perspectives. To test whether any random grouping of these same countries might
produce similar results, the 24 source countries are grouped into their many different possible
subgroups and their convergence coefficients are estimated. To test whether convergence within
groups might be towards one country that is common to most of the groups, the major trade
partner of the countries is removed from each of the groups, the new convergence coefficients are
estimated, and the results are compared. To test whether the tendency towards convergence is
considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than proximity or
common language, the countries are regrouped to reflect geographical closeness or common
languages; and the degree of convergence within each of these groups are then compared to the
results of the trade-based groups.

The results show that significant income convergence is not a common outcome among
countries when they are grouped randomly instead of grouping them according to their trade
partners; the convergence within groups is not towards one country that is common to most of the
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of the major
trade partners that are members in most of the groups; and the tendency towards convergence
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than
proximity or common language.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Income Convergence
Over the past years, there has been an ongoing debate as to whether the per capita incomes of
different national economies will converge. This debate has its roots in Heckscher (1919) and
Ohlin (1933) who hypothesized that free trade will draw factor prices towards equality. This was
later formalized by Samuelson (1948) as the factor price equalization theorem which provides
theoretical support for the idea that, under certain conditions, trade should lead to the equalization
of commodity prices and consequently to the equalization of factor prices. Alternatively, the
traditional growth literature (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965) claims that, even in the absence of
internationally mobile goods and factors, convergence to a steady state path should occur between
countries provided that they have identical production technologies, population growth, and
saving rates.17

The convergence debate has been largely empirical, focusing primarily on the validity of
the following three competing hypotheses:
(i) The absolute convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries converge to one
another in the long-run independently of their initial conditions.18
(ii) The conditional convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries that are identical in
their structural characteristics (e.g. preferences, technologies, rates of population growth,
government policies, etc.) converge to one another in the long-run independently of their initial
conditions.19

17

For a comprehensive survey of convergence and growth literature, see Sala-i Martin (1996), De la Fuente
(1997), and Temple (1999).
18
See Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Barro (1991) for conclusive evidence against this hypothesis.
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(iii) The club convergence hypothesis – per capita incomes of countries that are identical in their
structural characteristics converge to one another in the long-run provided that their initial
conditions are similar as well.20

The primary methodology used to test for the existence of convergence in several
studies21 was to regress growth rates on initial levels of income plus the additional factors that
one wished to control for. A negative relationship between the rates of growth and the initial
incomes was interpreted as implying convergence. Instead of taking a negative correlation
between the initial output level of one economy and its subsequent growth rate as evidence of
convergence, the time series convergence tests investigate for the differences in per capita output
to decrease over time. Bernard and Durlauf (1995) found that cross-sectional convergence is a
weaker notion than the time series notion of convergence. Cross-sectional tests tend to falsely
reject the null of no convergence when economies exhibit multiple long-run steady states.

By grouping countries into three income groups, Baumol (1986) found wealthy countries
belong to a convergence club, middle-income countries are moderately converging, and poor
countries are diverging over time. He argued that the public good property of national
productivity growth gives rise to convergence among industrialized nations; however, the lessdeveloped countries are unable to converge because of the lack of technology and education.
Kristensen (1982) grouped countries by their income levels and also found convergence among
the wealthier countries and divergence among poorer countries.

19

See Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) for supporting cross-country
evidence for the conditional convergence hypothesis.
20
See Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1996) for supporting evidence for the club convergence
hypothesis.
21
Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Mankiw et al. (1992).
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Ben-David (1994b) applied the time series notion of convergence and he showed that, in
contrast to the conventional wisdom, convergence among the relatively developed countries is far
from being a robust phenomenon. Some countries converge with others, but not with the
remainder. Other countries converge with different countries, but also not with most. A random
grouping of the more developed countries will not yield income convergence in more instances
than it will yield non-convergence.

2.2 Intra-Industry Trade
Traditional theories of international trade have not been extended to incorporate product
differentiation, economies of scale, and monopolistic competition; only in the last two decades
we have seen the emergence of a sizeable literature that links trade theory and industrial
organization, beginning with the studies of Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1979). It was further
extended by Krugman (1981), Helpman (1981), Ethier (1982), and others22.

One group of models that has emerged through the synthesis of international economics
and industrial organization includes the models of intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade
models provide an explanation for the simultaneous export and import of fairly similar goods. In
these models countries’ markets are characterized by imperfect competition involving
differentiated products and increasing returns to scale. The opening of trade results in a greater
product variety and an increased competition with a consequent reduction in costs and prices.

In their pioneering study which fundamentally changed the way economists view the
causes of international trade, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) established the extent of intra-industry
trade in different industrial nations, considered some measurement issues, and investigated

22

For a survey of the theoretical literature of intra-industry trade, see Bhagwati and Davis (1994).
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possible causes and consequences of such trade. To point out this fundamental change, Helpman
and Krugman (1989) refer to intra-industry trade as “one of the key empirical reasons for
emphasizing the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition in the world economy”
(Helpman and Krugman , 1989: p.133).

Since the introduction of the concept of intra-industry trade, a large literature developed
on the subject. Early efforts at the measurement of the extent of intra-industry trade were
followed by contributions to the theory of intra-industry trade. Furthermore, many studies have
attempted to identify the determinants of intra-industry trade. They have considerable differences
in model specification, estimation techniques, and the level of industry aggregation23.

Empirical studies on the intra-industry trade of the developing countries remained an
underresearched area for a long time, but increasing attention has been paid to this area in recent
years24. Most previous econometric studies have attempted to explain the intra-industry trade of
developed countries25. This may be partly because of the belief that the phenomenon of intraindustry trade is significant only among industrialized countries.

23

For a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, see Greenaway and Milner (1986).
Three such studies (Laird, 1981; Lee, 1987; and Gunasekera, 1989) are general reviews. Some other
papers include Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983; Tharakan, 1986; Ray, 1991; and Fukasaku, 1992.
25
Caves (1981), Toh (1982), and Balassa (1986) use the data for the U.S.; Lundberg (1982) for Sweden;
Greenaway (1983) for the U.K.; Kol and Mennes (1989) for the Netherlands; Tharakan (1986) for Benelux;
and Loertscher and Wolter (1980) for the OECD countries.
24
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2.3 Trade and Income Convergence
The increase in growth-related research in the past decades has included important contributions
that have focused on the relationship connecting international trade to economic growth and
convergence. However, neither traditional trade theory nor the various well known models of
economic growth offer very formal results that explain the possible connection between
international trade and income convergence across countries over time. Trade policy directly
affects the flows of goods and services between different countries, and liberalization of trade
leads to the convergence of factor prices in those countries – at least under the conditions
associated with the factor price equalization theorem (Samuelson, 1948). But convergence in
factor prices does not necessarily imply convergence in incomes. Moreover, even if trade
liberalization and income convergence are found to co-exist, this does not establish any causal
relationship between the two, and it does not mean that other variables are unimportant to the
convergence process.

The recent trade literature offers some theoretical models that deal with the linkages
between income convergence and trade. For example, addressing trade liberalization, Ben-David
and Loewy (1996) present a model that focuses on the role of trade in facilitating knowledge
spillovers, which subsequently can effect positively on income convergence. In related work,
Ben-David and Loewy (2000) develop an open economy endogenous growth model that
incorporates knowledge accumulation. Their model predicts that while trade liberalization will
increase the steady-state output growths of all countries, those countries that participate directly
in this liberalization will benefit the most in terms of their relative income levels.

Slaughter (1997) discusses the ways in which trade may be associated with income
convergence. He notes that trade can make the transfer of technology between economies easier,
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which will change the countries’ factor prices. For this to result in changes in per capita output,
he points out that situations must be avoided in which factor endowments are diverging
sufficiently to offset the technology transfer effects. He also states that trade in capital goods can
lead to convergence in per capita income by changing countries’ relative factor endowments.

The empirical literature has added considerably to our understanding of the relationship
between international trade and income convergence through the analyses of various sets of data.
Within this literature we find a number of definitions of convergence, applications of different
statistical tools, and the emergence of a wide variety of results. The conclusions that one reaches
depend generally on the type of data, the time-period in question, and the level of development of
the economies under consideration. The existing evidence on trade and international income
differences is mixed. There is some evidence for that trade causes convergence and other
evidence for that it causes divergence.

Using several criteria, Sachs and Warner (1995) classify each country in 1970 as either
“open” or “closed” to international trade. From 1970 to 1989 only in the group of open countries,
the poorer countries in 1970 have grown faster over the next 19 years. They conclude that “the
open economies display a strong tendency towards economic convergence…the convergence club
is the club of economies linked together by international trade” (Sachs and Warner, 1995: p.41).

Ben-David (1996) finds that from 1960 to 1989, groups of relatively wealthy countries
which trade significantly among each other tend to display significant per capita income
convergence relative to the convergence patterns of randomly grouped countries. He concludes
that “these findings would appear to support the intuition of Heckscher and Ohlin that trade does
indeed play an equalizing role” (Ben-David, 1996: p.294).
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Ben-David (1993) analyzes post-1945 trade liberalization and finds that per capita
income dispersion among liberalizing countries decreased after liberalization started. He writes
that “this paper provides evidence that movement toward free trade may actually…be leading to a
reduction in income disparity across countries…The factor price equalization theorem provides a
framework for relating trade’s impact on income convergence” (Ben-David, 1993: p.653).

Dollar (1992), Edwards (1993), Harrison (1995), and Henrekson et al. (1996) focus on
the impact of trade openness on economic growth. The results from these studies indicate that
there is a positive relationship between trade liberalization and per capita income convergence.

On the other hand, Bernard and Jones (1996) conclude that freer trade actually diverges
incomes across countries. They use cross-section and time series techniques to study the
movements of productivity levels in 14 OECD countries during 1970-1987. They examine
technological convergence by focusing on total factor productivity. The results indicate that
sectoral differences are important for understanding movements in aggregate income and
productivity. Within sectors across countries there is evidence for convergence for some
industries, but not for others. These differences across sectors account for convergence at the
national level. Within manufacturing, they find only weak evidence for convergence over the
period and find substantial evidence for divergence of productivity levels during the 1980s. Using
a “difference in differences” methodology developed by Meyer (1994), Slaughter (2001) finds
that various post-1945 trade liberalization appears to have led to income divergence, rather than
convergence. Trade-mediated technology flows change countries’ real factor prices and thus per
capita income. If technology does not flow from advanced to less-advanced countries, then freer
trade need not converge incomes across countries. Richer countries grow even richer because
they focus more on the high-technology products.
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
The 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries26 are included in the analysis
with per capita incomes of $10, 000 or higher in 2002. In the order of decreasing per capita GNP,
these countries are Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland,
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France,
Australia, Italy, Israel, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece. The trade statistics are taken
from World Trade Annuals of the United Nations Statistics Division. GNP data are from the
International Financial Statistics.

The investigation covers Section 7 of the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) industry groups, i.e. “Machinery and Transport Equipment”. This section includes
technological goods which involve production technologies that are not universally available and
change relatively frequently. For most industrialized countries, it has been known that intraindustry trade occurs in these SITC industry groups. These include those industries which share
the typical characteristics of industries involved in intra-industry trade, such as product
differentiation, economies of scale, and rapid innovation. Some industry groups in Section 7
include engines, turbines, motors, power generating machinery, tractors, textile and leather
machinery, printing machinery, heating-cooling equipment, non-electrical machinery, office
machines, television receivers, radio broadcast receivers, telecom equipment, transistors, road
motor vehicles, railway vehicles, aircraft, and ships.

26

The 24 developed countries in this study are OECD countries. We can extend our study by adding other
developed countries and/or developing countries.
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3.2 Grubel-Lloyd Index and Aggregation Problem
The Grubel-Lloyd (hereafter, GL) index is the central measure of intra-industry trade and almost
all of the empirical studies have used this index; so in this paper, this measure is employed, which
is expressed as
IITi = [1 – (| Xi – Mi | / (Xi + Mi))],

(1)

where Xi is exports of industry i, Mi is imports of industry i, |Xi – Mi | is net trade, (Xi + Mi) is total
trade, and 0 ≤ IITi ≤ 1. An index value of 0 would indicate complete inter-industry trade. Either
the value of exports or imports would be zero. Higher index values are associated with greater
intra-industry trade as a proportion of total trade, with an index value of 1 indicating equality
between exports and imports. We will use this measure just to create trade groups as explained in
the next subsection.

When Eq. (1) is aggregated across industries to form a weighted average intra-industry
trade measure, the resulting index will not attain the desired maximum value of 1 if the country’s
total commodity trade is imbalanced. The greater is the imbalance, the smaller will be the share of
intra-industry trade. Based on this finding, GL (1975) argue that this measure of intra-industry
trade must be adjusted for the aggregate trade imbalance.

According to Vona (1991), and Kol and Mennes (1989), measures of intra-industry trade
should not be corrected for the overall trade imbalance. Vona (1991) argues that the argument for
the need of correction is theoretically poor and leads to unreliable adjustment procedure and he
uses arithmetic examples to establish the superiority of GL’s uncorrected index over corrected
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indices which appear in the literature. Based on these, this paper will use GL’s uncorrected
measure of intra-industry trade27.

3.3 Creation of the Trade Groups
The first step is to define who is a major trade partner of whom and how should the trade groups
be formed. The usual practice in analyzing the effect of trade on the growth process is to combine
imports and exports and examine their joint effect. In this paper, the primary focus is on intraindustry trade’s relationship to the convergence process. Trade groups are formed on the basis of
intra-industry trade among countries rather than only exports or imports. For each of the 24
source countries, major intra-industry trade partners are found to form each source country’s trade
groups. To keep the examination within manageable proportions, the goal is to implement some
general criterion that limits the size of the trade groups to fewer than ten countries. The
composition of the intra-industry trade groups is determined according to the following criterion.
Suppose that country i is one of the 24 source countries. After finding the Grubel-Lloyd intraindustry trade indices, if the intra-industry trade share of the total trade between country i and
country j is more than 85% in 2002 (the final year of the sample) 28, then country j will be part of
country i’s trade group. The groups resulting from the 85% threshold ranged in size from 3
countries per group to 8 countries per group. Table 1 in the Appendix lists the countries forming
each of the trade groups.

27

Ballance et al. (1992), Lundberg (1992), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), and Globerman and Dean (1990)
are examples of recent studies that do not correct intra-industry trade indices for the overall trade
imbalance. Bergstrand (1990) uses the GL adjusted index. The methodology and rationale for the
adjustment is discussed in Bergstrand (1983).
28
Creating trade groups based on end-of-period (i.e. 2002) trade data is in order to create groups of
countries that have evolved over time into major trade partners, hence increasing the likelihood of finding
convergence. If the grouping criterion had been based on beginning-of-period (i.e. 1971) data, it might have
included countries that were no longer major trade partners by the period’s end.
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4 The Model
4.1 Income Convergence Model
Having formed the trade groups, the behavior of each group’s income differentials over time is
examined for a significant evidence of convergence within them. Following Ben-David (1996),
the convergence measure is based on the following relationship:
(yi,t - yt ) = Φ (yi,t-1 - yt −1 ) + εi,t,

(2)

where yi,t is the log of country i’s real per capita income at time t and yt is the average29 of the
group’s log per capita incomes at time t. Φ < 1 indicates the existence of income convergence
within the group and Φ > 1 indicates divergence. The estimated Φ provides an indication of the
rate of convergence within the given group. The half-life30 (h) of the convergence process, the
number of years that it takes for the income gap to be cut in half is given by ln(0.5) / ln(Φ).

The countries within each group are pooled together for the estimation of Eq. (2) and the
convergence coefficient Φ is calculated for each group using the Newey-West estimator which
provides a covariance matrix estimator that is consistent in the presence of both
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.

While there are clearly more sophisticated methods available for estimating convergence
(see for example, Quah, 1993; Bernard and Durlauf, 1995), the primary attractiveness of this

29

This is an unweighted average of the group’s log per capita incomes at time t. We can also give weights
to countries in the groups according to their GNPs, and use a weighted average.
30

The half life (h) is derived in Ben-David (1993) as follows. If yt+1 = Φ yt , then yt+h = Φh yt. Since yt+x =
0.5 yt by definition, then 0.5 yt= Φh yt, or 0.5 = Φh. Taking logs of both sides and dividing by log Φ gives h
as log 0.5 / log Φ.
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measure lies in its simplicity, its applicability to relatively small groups of countries, and its
usefulness for conducting relatively quick and simple convergence comparisons across groups
that include different country compositions.

Results of the Eq. (2) estimation for each of the trade groups are reported in Table 2 in
the Appendix. The source country of each group is listed first, followed by the number of
countries in each trade group, the group’s estimated convergence coefficient, standard error, and
the half-life (double-life) of the convergence (divergence) process. The results indicate that most
of the trade groups exhibite income convergence; 18 of the 21 groups have a φˆ less than 1, with
11 of these outcomes significant at the 10% level at least. Only 3 of the 21 trade groups have an
estimated convergence coefficient greater than unity and only one of these three outcomes is
significant at the 5% level.

When the trade groups are formed according to the total trade between the countries
rather than intra-industry trade, we see a significant decrease in the number of the groups which
exhibit income convergence. The results in Table 3 in the Appendix show that 14 of the 23
groups have a φˆ less than 1, with only 6 of these outcomes significant at the 10% level at least.

4.2 Random Country Groupings
Are the results in the last section indicative of intra-industry trade-related convergence, or does
any random grouping of these same countries might produce similar results? To test this, the 21
source countries are regrouped into their many different possible subgroups, their convergence
coefficients are estimated, and the results are compared with those in Table 2. Since the intraindustry trade-based groups ranged in sizes of 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; the various random subgroups will
also range in the same sizes. For each subgroup, 500 random samples are estimated. As it is
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evident from Table 4 in the Appendix, a random grouping of any size is more likely to produce φˆ
> 1, i.e. a divergence outcome. Percentage of φˆ that is greater than 1 is 52%, 60%, 70%, 80%,
and 82% for the group sizes of 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8, respectively.

Table 5 in the Appendix makes it easier to compare the results. For example, Austria’s
intra-industry trade-based group consists of 8 countries and it has an estimated φˆ of 0.9953. It
can be seen that the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed group of 8 countries out of the
original 24 countries and getting a φˆ less than 0.9953 is only 15%.

4.3 Exclusion of Partners
Is it possible that all of this convergence within groups might be towards one country that is
common to most of the groups? The United States and Ireland are two candidates for this type of
bias, since they are trade partners in 8 of the 18 groups which had a φˆ less than 1. Their removal
from each of the groups would then reduce the convergence bias, if it exists.

The estimated convergence coefficients for the intra-industry trade-based groups are
below unity in all of the 8 groups when USA is excluded (6 of them are significant) and they are
below unity in 7 of the 8 groups when Ireland is excluded from the groups (6 of them are
significant). As it can be seen in Table 6 and in Table 7 in the Appendix, the exclusion of the
USA and Ireland does not significantly change the high incidence of convergence within the trade
groups. The last column in the tables makes it easier to compare the results. For example, in
Table 6, Belgium’s intra-industry trade-based group consists of 7 countries when USA is
excluded and it has an estimated φˆ of 0.9773. It can be seen that the likelihood of drawing a
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randomly constructed group of 7 countries out of the original 24 countries (with no USA
included) and getting a φˆ less than 0.9773 is only 13%.

4.4 Language and Proximity
Many of the countries that comprise the trade groups share other characteristics as well. For
example, 6 of the source countries share English as their primary language. Moreover, quite a few
of the countries are also in close geographical proximity to one another. Since common language
and proximity facilitate information flows and these flows are a source of income convergence,
then it is possible that the income convergence exhibited by the trade groups is due less to trade
flows than to proximity or common language. After regrouping the countries to reflect common
languages or geographical closeness, the degree of convergence within each of these groups could
be compared with the results of the intra-industry trade-based groups.

Geographical proximity is defined to be a neighboring country with a common border, or
when the border is water, the nearest neighbor across the water. In keeping with the trade group’s
minimum size of three, only proximity and language-based groups with at least three countries
were examined. Under these criteria, there are 16 regional groups and one language group
(English) the composition of which may be found in Table 8 in the Appendix. As the results in
Table 9 in the Appendix indicate, there is no evidence of significant convergence within the
group of English-speaking countries. As far as geography-based groups are concerned, just 7 of
16 groups (less than one half of the groups) exhibit income convergence at a significance level of
10% or higher. On the other hand we had found in Section 4.1 that approximately two-thirds (13
of 21) of the intra-industry trade-based groups exhibited significant convergence. Thus, the
tendency towards convergence appears to be stronger when the basis for constructing groups is
trade rather than proximity or common language.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we attempt to present evidence that income convergence among countries seems to
be a common feature among countries that trade extensively with one another, especially in those
industries which share the typical characteristics of industries involved in intra-industry trade,
such as product differentiation, economies of scale, and rapid innovation.

Grouping countries according to their primary intra-industry trade partnerships tends to
produce significant income convergence within the groups. When the trade groups are formed
according to the total trade between the countries rather than intra-industry trade, we see a
significant decrease in the number of the groups which exhibit income convergence. Significant
income convergence is not a common outcome among countries when they are grouped
randomly. Moreover, this convergence is not towards one country that is common to most of the
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of trade
patterns that are members in most of the groups. Finally, the tendency towards convergence
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than
proximity or common language.
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Appendix
Table 1. List of Countries in Trade Groups (IIT-Based Groups)
Source Country Countries in Group

.

Austria

Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Sweden, USA

Belgium

France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, USA

Canada

Denmark, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, USA

Denmark

Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, USA

Finland

Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Sweden

France

Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, USA

Germany

Austria, Ireland, Portugal

Iceland

Greece, Portugal

Ireland

Japan, UK, USA

Israel

Greece, Iceland, USA

Italy

Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Sweden, UK, USA

Japan

Ireland, Sweden

Luxemburg

Sweden, UK

Netherlands

Belgium, Canada, Germany, Sweden

Norway

Australia, Canada, UK

Portugal

Australia, Austria, Germany, Iceland

Spain

Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, UK

Sweden

Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK

Switzerland

Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Sweden

UK

France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA

USA

Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, UK
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Table 2. Trade Groups’ Convergence Coefficients (IIT-Based Groups)

a

Source Countrya

#b

φˆ

Austria

8

0.9953

0.0055

Belgium

7

0.9867

Canada

7

Denmark

Standard Error Half-life

Double-life

147

0

0.0065**

52

0

0.9913

0.0052*

79

0

8

0.9781

0.0057***

31

0

Finland

7

0.9951

0.0094

141

0

France

8

0.9788

0.0051***

32

0

Germany

4

0.9961

0.0052

177

0

Iceland

3

0.9985

0.0053

462

0

Ireland

4

0.9821

0.0076**

38

0

Israel

4

1.0027

0.0047

0

257

Italy

8

0.9812

0.0068***

37

0

Japan

3

0.9802

0.0080**

35

0

Luxemburg

3

1.0283

0.0125

0

25

Netherlands

5

0.9737

0.0133**

26

0

Norway

4

1.0167

0.0070

0

42

Portugal

5

0.9941

0.0053

117

0

Spain

7

0.9827

0.0043***

40

0

Sweden

8

0.9952

0.0065

144

0

Switzerland

7

0.9921

0.0071

87

0

UK

8

0.9927

0.0033**

95

0

USA

7

0.9859

0.0069**

49

0

.

Source countries include those countries for which there are at least two other countries

such that the intra-industry trade share of the total trade between the source country and
the other country is more than 85% in 2002. Australia, Greece, and New Zealand do not
satisfy this criterion.
b

# represents the number of countries in each group. The countries in each group are in Table 1.

***

Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level.

**

Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.

*

Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.
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Table 3. Trade Groups’ Convergence Coefficients (Trade-Based Groups)
Source Countrya

#b

φˆ

Australia

6

1.0067

0.0067

0

104

Austria

5

0.9962

0.0051

182

0

Belgium

7

0.9959

0.0047

169

0

Denmark

8

1.0048

0.0059

0

145

Finland

8

0.9914

0.0053

80

0

France

8

0.9947

0.0043

130

0

Germany

10

0.9882

0.0042***

58

0

Greece

7

1.0013

0.0046

58

0

Iceland

9

0.9981

0.0047

364

0

Ireland

7

0.9812

0.0071***

36

0

Israel

7

0.9877

0.0053**

56

0

Italy

8

0.9886

0.0041***

56

0

Japan

3

1.0031

0.0057

0

223

Luxemburg

6

1.0228

0.0091

0

30

Netherlands

7

0.9959

0.0047

168

0

New Zealand

6

1.0067

0.0067

0

103

Norway

8

1.0048

0.0059

0

144

Portugal

5

0.9922

0.0048

88

0

Spain

7

0.9948

0.0043

132

0

10

1.0002

0.0061

0

3466

Switzerland

7

0.9855

0.0046***

47

0

UK

9

0.9899

0.0044**

68

0

USA

5

1.0023

0.0072

0

301

Sweden

a

Standard Error Half-life

Double-life

Source countries include those countries for which there are at least two other countries

such that the trade share between the source country and the other country is more
than 4% in 2002. Australia, Greece, and New Zealand do not satisfy this criterion.
***

Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level.

**

Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.

*

.

Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.

84

Table 4. Distribution of Convergence Coefficients
Group size
3

4

φˆ

5

.
7

8 .

Percentages

.

1

48

40

30

20

18

0.99

33

25

18

12

10

0.98

23

18

12

7

5

0.97

15

12

7

3

2

0.96

12

8

5

1.6

1.2

0.95

10

5

2

1.2

1.0

0.94

8

3

1

0.6

0.4

0.93

5

2

0.8

0.4

0.2

0.92

4

1

0.4

0.2

0.2
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Table 5. Comparison of the Results when Groups are Formed Randomly
Source Countrya

#b

φˆ c

Probabilityd

Austria

8

0.9953

15

Belgium

7

0.9867

10

Canada

7

0.9913

13

Denmark

8

0.9781

4

Finland

7

0.9951

16

France

8

0.9788

4

Germany

4

0.9961

34

Iceland

3

0.9985

45

Ireland

4

0.9821

20

Italy

8

0.9812

6

Japan

3

0.9802

23

Netherlands

5

0.9737

9

Portugal

5

0.9941

22

Spain

7

0.9827

8

Sweden

8

0.9952

14

Switzerland

7

0.9921

13

UK

8

0.9927

12

USA

7

0.9859

10

a

.

Source countries include those countries for which the intra-industry

trade-based group exhibited income convergence.
b

# represents the number of countries in each group. The countries in

each group are listed in Table 1.
c

Φ represents the intra-industry trade-based group’s estimated convergence

coefficient.
d

Probability denotes the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed

group of corresponding size and getting a convergence coefficient which
is less than Φ that is listed in the third column of the table.
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Table 6. Comparison of the Results when USA is Excluded
Source Countrya

#b

φˆ c

Belgium

7

0.9773

0.0056***

13

Canada

7

0.9918

0.0062

15

Denmark

8

0.9727

0.0125**

6

France

8

0.9752

0.0064***

8

Ireland

4

0.9835

0.0045***

18

Italy

8

0.9861

0.0137

5

UK

8

0.9909

0.0049*

11

USA

7

0.9859

0.0057**

15

a

Standard Error

Probabilityd

Source countries include those countries for which the

intra-industry trade-based group exhibited income convergence
and USA was in the group.
b

# represents the number of countries in each group. The countries

in each group are listed in Table 1.
c

Φ represents the intra-industry trade-based group’s estimated

convergence coefficient when USA is removed from the group.
d

Probability denotes the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed

group of corresponding size and getting a convergence coefficient
which is less than Φ that is listed in the third column of the table.
***

Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level.

**

Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.

*

Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.
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.

Table 7. Comparison of the Results when Ireland is Excluded
Source Countrya

#b

φˆ c

Belgium

7

0.9923

0.0035**

11

Canada

7

0.9876

0.0041***

17

France

8

0.9827

0.0026***

8

Ireland

4

0.9835

0.0038***

15

Italy

8

0.9903

0.0054*

9

Japan

3

1.0092

0.0059

28

Spain

7

0.9859

0.0061**

18

USA

7

0.9992

0.0036

13

a

Standard Error

Probabilityd

Source countries include those countries for which the

intra-industry trade-based group exhibited income convergence
and Ireland was in the group.
b

# represents the number of countries in each group. The countries

in each group are listed in Table 1.
c

Φ represents the intra-industry trade-based group’s estimated

convergence coefficient when Ireland is removed from the group.
d

Probability denotes the likelihood of drawing a randomly constructed

group of corresponding size and getting a convergence coefficient
which is less than Φ that is listed in the third column of the table.
***

Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level.

**

Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.

*

Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.
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Table 8. List of Countries in Language and Geographical Groups
Source Country

Countries in Group

.

Language-based group
English

Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA

Geography-based groups
Austria

Germany, Italy, Switzerland

Belgium

France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, UK

Denmark

Germany, Norway, Sweden

Finland

Norway, Sweden

France

Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain, Switzerland, UK

Germany

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland

Iceland

Ireland, Norway, UK

Ireland

Iceland, UK

Italy

Austria, France, Switzerland

Luxemburg

Belgium, France, Germany

Netherlands

Belgium, Germany

Norway

Denmark, Finland, Sweden

Spain

France, Portugal

Sweden

Denmark, Finland, Norway

Switzerland

Austria, France, Germany, Italy

UK

Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands
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Table 9. Convergence Coefficients of Groups Based on Language and Proximity
Source Countrya

#b

φˆ

t-statistic

6

0.9879

0.0076

.

Language-based group
English

Geography-based groups
Austria

4

0.9787

0.0044***

Belgium

6

1.0307

0.0097

Denmark

4

1.0091

0.0103

Finland

3

1.0067

0.0123

France

8

0.9953

0.0056

Germany

8

0.9934

0.0082

Iceland

4

0.9864

0.0089

Ireland

3

0.9771

0.0111**

Italy

4

0.9824

0.0041***

Luxemburg

4

1.0321

0.0092

Netherlands

3

0.9001

0.0319***

Norway

4

0.9985

0.0121

Spain

3

0.9911

0.0046*

Sweden

4

0.9985

0.0121

Switzerland

5

0.9789

0.0046***

UK

5

0.9673

0.0106*** .

a

Source countries include those countries for which proximity

and language-based groups contain at least three countries.
b

# represents the number of countries in each group. The countries

in each group are listed in Table 8.
***

Significantly less than 1 at the 1%level.

**

Significantly less than 1 at the 5%level.

*

Significantly less than 1 at the 10%level.
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Chapter 4. Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in a MultiCountry & Multi-Industry Framework: An Empirical Analysis
1 Introduction
Traditional theories of international trade have not been extended to incorporate product
differentiation, economies of scale, and monopolistic competition; only in the last two decades
we have seen the emergence of a sizeable literature that links trade theory and industrial
organization, beginning with the studies of Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1979).

One group of models that has emerged through the synthesis of international economics
and industrial organization includes the models of intra-industry trade. Intra-industry trade
models provide an explanation for the simultaneous export and import of fairly similar goods. In
these models countries’ markets are characterized by imperfect competition involving
differentiated products and increasing returns to scale. The opening of trade results in a greater
product variety and an increased competition with a consequent reduction in costs and prices.

Trade theorists have provided rigorous and elegant models generating intra-industry
trade. In their pioneering study which fundamentally changed the way economists view the
causes of international trade, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) established the extent of intra-industry
trade in different industrial nations, considered some measurement issues, and investigated
possible causes and consequences of such trade. To point out this fundamental change, Helpman
and Krugman (1989: p.133) refer to intra-industry trade as “one of the key empirical reasons for
emphasizing the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition in the world economy”.
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Krugman (1979), Lancaster (1980), and Helpman (1981) developed intra-industry trade
theory (IIT) using a monopolistic competition model to explain modern trade patterns. The model
allows for the presence of increasing returns to scale in production and for differentiated
products. Intra-industry trade may arise under their framework. Krugman (1979) first generated a
model in which monopolistically competitive firms produced differentiated products with an
increasing returns to scale (IRTS) technology. He later extended this model (Krugman, 1981) to
allow for both intra- and inter-industry trade. These models were further developed in Helpman
and Krugman (1985). In general, these models are characterized by increasing returns on the
production side and a utility model that rewards product diversity on the consumption side. A
common result in these models is that countries trade similar goods.

Since the introduction of the concept of intra-industry trade, a large literature developed
on the subject. Early efforts at the measurement of the extent of intra-industry trade were
followed by contributions to the theory of intra-industry trade. Furthermore, many studies have
attempted to identify the determinants of intra-industry trade. They have considerable differences
in model specification, estimation techniques, and the level of industry aggregation31.

In the literature, one group of authors has concentrated on the measurement of intraindustry trade. Another group has taken econometric approaches and attempted to test the theory
of intra-industry trade with data on an observed country or a group of countries. This research
belongs to the second group. This study provides recent evidence on determinants of the intraindustry trade in a multi-country & multi-industry framework. Bilateral trade data of the year
2002 at three-digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) industry groups is used for
24 developed countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,

31

For a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, see Greenaway and Milner (1986).
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Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.

First, a theoretical summary of a two-country model based on product differentiation and
economies of scale is provided, following Helpman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman (1985).
Then, using this model, the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade are analyzed in the trade
of each country with every other country in each industry category. The hypotheses that are tested
in this study investigate the effect of the following country characteristics on the bilateral intraindustry trade: average country size, average per capita income, country size difference, per
capita income difference, distance, common border, participation in economic integration
systems, and common language.

This paper follows closely the studies of Helpman (1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985,
ch.7), and Kim and Oh (2001). This research contributes to the existing literature of intra-industry
trade in several ways. This study employs very recent trade data, namely data of 2002. Second,
the data in the analysis is wide-ranging32; 24 developed countries are included. Third, this study
concentrates on testing country characteristics while most empirical studies33 of intra-industry
trade have concentrated on testing industry characteristics such as economies of scale and product
differentiation. Fourth, the empirical analysis covers a wide variety of country characteristics
together, which are developed separately in the literature, i.e., average country size, average per

32

The total number of observations is expected to be 12, 144 (= 24C2 (= 276) country combinations x 44
SITC categories) but in considerable amount of cases (18 %) neither exports nor imports exist in bilateral
trade flows. Then the index of intra-industry trade is not defined and these observations are excluded from
the analysis.
33
Clark (1993), Lundberg (1992), Ray (1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Marvel and Ray (1987),
Balassa (1986), Greenaway and Milner (1984).
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capita income, country size difference, per capita income difference, distance, common border,
participation in economic integration systems, and common language.

The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is positively correlated
with average GNP, average GNP/capita, and the existence of a common border; and it is
negatively correlated with differences in GNP and GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are
highly significant statistically. The EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected positive
sign and are highly significant statistically. The regression coefficients of the language dummy
variables have a positive sign, but their level of statistical significance varies. Moreover, the
results show that the variables Average GNP and Difference in GNP are the country
characteristics that contribute the most to the explanatory power of the regression equations.
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2 Literature Review
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model leads us to expect that trade should typically
be between countries with different factor endowments – capital-abundant countries should trade
with labor-abundant; the composition of trade should reflect the sources of comparative
advantage; and trade should have strong effects on income distribution, i.e. when a country trades
capital–intensive exports for labor-intensive imports, its workers should end up worse off.

What empirical studies found out was that trends in world trade did not seem to accord
with these expectations. The largest and rapidly growing part of world trade was trade among the
industrial countries, which seemed fairly similar in their factor endowments and were clearly
becoming more similar over time.

In the early 1980s came the crucial theoretical development and the theory of intraindustry trade has become part of mainstream international economics, when subsequent
investigations were motivated by theories based on horizontal product differentiation,
monopolistic competition, and increasing returns to scale. This synthesis of industrial
organization and international trade was first proposed independently in papers by Krugman
(1979), Dixit and Norman (1980), and Lancaster (1980). It was further extended by Krugman
(1981), Helpman (1981), Ethier (1982), and others34.

The pioneering Helpman-Krugman model demonstrates intra-industry trade, based on
specialization in different varieties due to economies of scale in the manufacturing sector
(Helpman, 1981; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The model includes both the elements of

34

For a survey of the theoretical literature of intra-industry trade, see Bhagwati and Davis (1994).
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product differentiation and monopolistic competition. Every firm chooses a variety and its price
to maximize profits, taking as given the variety choice and pricing strategy of the other producers
in the industry. In this case every firm ends up producing a different variety of the product. Under
a demand structure within which there is a taste of variety, for every pair of countries that
produce varieties of the good, intra-industry trade will be observed. Under monopolistic
competition, each country will produce different varieties of the product, every variety will be
demanded in both countries and consumers will benefit from an increased number of varieties and
from lower prices.

In analyzing the factors that determine the extent of intra-industry trade in an intercountry context, Linder (1961) advanced the hypothesis that the extent of trade in differentiated
products will be the greater, the more similar are income levels among the trading countries. This
hypothesis reflects the assumption that similarities in income levels are associated with
similarities in demand structures. Helpman (1981) provided proof of the proposition that the
extent of intra-industry trade will be the greater, the more similar is the size of the trading
partners. This proposition can be expressed in the form of a testable hypothesis that the extent of
intra-industry trade is negatively correlated with inter-country differences in regard to the gross
national product, taken to be a measure of market size.

Empirical studies on the intra-industry trade of the developing countries remained an
underresearched area for a long time, but increasing attention has been paid to this area in recent
years35. Most previous econometric studies have attempted to explain the intra-industry trade of

35

Three such studies (Laird, 1981; Lee, 1987; and Gunasekera, 1989) are general reviews. Some other
papers include Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983; Tharakan, 1986; Ray, 1991; and Fukasaku, 1992.
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developed countries36. This may be partly because of the belief that the phenomenon of intraindustry trade is significant only among industrialized countries.

Two studies focus on the most direct proposition of the Helpman-Krugman model, that
the proportion of intra-industry as opposed to inter-industry trade should be positively correlated
with the degree of similarity between countries’ capital-labor ratios. Loertscher and Wolter
(1980) use differences in per capita income as a proxy for differences in resource endowments,
and confirm the correlation using a cross-section for a single year. Helpman (1987) uses a more
extended data set to confirm the proposition over a number of years; he also shows that as the
industrial countries became more similar over time, the relative importance of intra-industry trade
grew, just as the model would suggest.

The Helpman-Krugman model was also tested by Lynde (1992). He performed an
econometric analysis of the trade flows of 52 countries for the year 1980, with the aim of
comparing the accuracy of the predictions of the Helpman-Krugman model. Lynde’s findings
were very consistent with the predictions of the Helpman-Krugman model.

Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983) confirm a proposition that intra-industry trade is likely to
be more common in the trade between developed countries than in the trade between developing
countries, on the assumption that developed countries produce more differentiated products.

Greenaway and Milner (1986) have surveyed the literature on the testing of hypotheses
concerning intra-industry trade. They suggest that the hypotheses can be classified in three
groups. The first group of studies identifies country-specific characteristics that influence the

36

Loertscher and Wolter (1980) use the data for the OECD countries; Lundberg (1982) for Sweden;
Greenaway (1983) for the U.K.; Tharakan (1986) for Benelux; and Balassa (1986) for the U.S..
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extent of intra-industry trade37. The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is
positively correlated with country characteristics. The general consistency of the signs and the
significance levels of the coefficients give support for the country-specific hypotheses.

The second group of studies has emphasized industry-specific determinants of intraindustry trade relating to scale economies, product differentiation, and imperfect competition38.
Greenaway and Milner conclude that there are some systematic inter-industry characteristics of
intra-industry trade, and varying degrees of support for the hypotheses, but country characteristics
seem to be more important than industry characteristics in explaining intra-industry trade.

The final group of empirical studies analyzed policy-based hypotheses relating to tariffs,
non-tariff barriers, and economic integration39. Greenaway and Milner conclude that there is no
consistent empirical evidence that variations in intra-industry trade can be explained by policy
interventions.

A more recent study is Kim and Oh (2001). From the cross-sectional analysis using 19701994 data, results are obtained that support the following three empirical hypotheses: The share
of intra-industry trade will be large: (a) if the two economies are of similar size, (b) if the capitallabor endowment ratio of both countries is similar, and (c) if the total size of the two economies is
large.

37

Loertscher and Wolter (1980), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Balassa (1986), and Globerman and Dean
(1990).
38
Culem and Lundberg (1983), Greenaway and Milner (1984), Balassa (1986), Marvel and Ray (1987),
Ray (1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Lundberg (1992), and Clark (1993).
39
Balassa (1986), Bergstrand (1983), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Toh (1982), Caves (1981), and
Loertscher and Wolter (1980).
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Trade data of 2002 for 24 developed countries are included in the analysis with per capita
incomes of $10, 000 or higher. In the order of decreasing per capita GNP, these countries are
Luxembourg, Norway, USA, Switzerland, Japan, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Canada, Germany, Belgium, France, Australia, Italy,
Israel, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece.

The investigation covers 44 three-digit industry groups which belong to Section 7 of the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) system. The three-digit SITC classification is
typically considered an ‘industry’ for econometric purposes. Import and export data with a value
of $50,000 or more are included in the analysis. Trade statistics are taken from World Trade
Annuals of the United Nations Statistics Division. GNP data are from the International Financial
Statistics. Per capita GNP data is from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. GNP in current
prices is used as a proxy variable for the size of the economies, and per capita GNP is used for the
capital-labor endowment ratio.

Section 7, i.e. “Machinery and Transport Equipment” includes technological goods which
involve production technologies that are not universally available and change relatively
frequently. For most industrialized countries, it has been known that intra-industry trade occurs in
these SITC industry groups. These include those industries which share the typical characteristics
of industries involved in intra-industry trade, such as product differentiation, economies of scale,
and rapid innovation. Some industry groups in Section 7 include engines, turbines, motors, power
generating machinery, tractors, textile and leather machinery, printing machinery, heating-cooling
equipment, non-electrical machinery, office machines, television receivers, radio broadcast
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receivers, telecom equipment, transistors, road motor vehicles, railway vehicles, aircraft, and
ships.
The total number of observations is 12, 144 (=24C2 (=276) country combinations x 44
SITC categories); but in 18 % of cases neither exports nor imports exist in bilateral trade flows,
so intra-industry trade index is not defined and these observations are excluded from the analysis.
So then we have a total of 9976 observations.

3.2 Grubel-Lloyd Index and Aggregation Problem
The Grubel-Lloyd (hereafter, GL) index is the central measure of intra-industry trade and almost
all of the empirical studies have used this index; so at this research, this measure will be
employed, expressed as
IITi = [1 – (| Xi – Mi | / (Xi + Mi))],

(1)

where Xi is exports of industry i, Mi is imports of industry i, |Xi – Mi | is net trade, (Xi + Mi) is total
trade, i = 1,…,n and 0 ≤ IITi ≤ 1. An index value of 0 would indicate complete inter-industry
trade. Either the value of exports or imports would be zero. Higher index values are associated
with greater intra-industry trade as a proportion of total trade, with an index value of 1 indicating
equality between exports and imports.

When Eq. (1) is aggregated across industries to form a weighted average intra-industry
trade measure, the resulting index will not attain the desired maximum value of 1 if the country’s
total commodity trade is imbalanced. The greater is the imbalance, the smaller will be the share of
intra-industry trade. Based on this finding, GL (1975) argue that this measure of intra-industry
trade must be adjusted for the aggregate trade imbalance.
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According to Vona (1991), and Kol and Mennes (1989), measures of intra-industry trade
should not be corrected for the overall trade imbalance. Vona (1991) argues that the argument for
the need of correction is theoretically poor and leads to unreliable adjustment procedure and he
uses arithmetic examples to establish the superiority of GL’s uncorrected index over corrected
indices which appear in the literature. Based on these, the proposed study will employ GL’s
uncorrected measure of intra-industry trade40.

3.3 Estimation Techniques
In estimating the determinants of intra-industry trade, most authors use a linear or log-linear
function by ordinary least squares (e.g., Toh, 1982; Lundberg, 1982; and Tharakan, 1986). We
will use OLS and truncated regression. We have truncated data since we don’t allow our
observations to be less than 0 or greater than 1; that is the sample is drawn from a restricted part
of the population. When using OLS, Newey-West estimator is used which provides a covariance
matrix that is consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.

3.4 Methodology
In following, we state the hypotheses that have been tested in our paper and define the
explanatory variables used in the estimation. We also refer to the theoretical literature where the
hypotheses originate.

It is hypothesized that the extent of intra-industry trade between any pair of countries will be:
(1) positively correlated with average per capita incomes, representing the extent of demand for
differentiate products (Linder, 1961);

40

Ballance et al. (1992), Lundberg (1992), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), and Globerman and Dean (1990)
are examples of recent studies that do not correct intra-industry trade indices for the overall trade
imbalance. Bergstrand (1990) uses the GL adjusted index. The methodology and rationale for the
adjustment is discussed in Bergstrand (1983: pp. 206-209).
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(2) negatively correlated with differences in per capita incomes, representing differences in
demand structures (Linder, 1961) and / or differences in resource endowments (Dixit and
Norman, 1980; Helpman, 1981);
(3) positively correlated with average country size, indicating the possibilities for increasing the
variety of differentiated products manufactured under economies of scale (Lancaster, 1980); and
(4) negatively correlated with differences in country size, indicating differences in their ability to
manufacture differentiated products (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Helpman, 1981).

In testing hypotheses (1) to (4), per capita income has been represented by GNP per
capita and country size by GNP. Instead of taking the absolute values of inter-country differences
in per capita incomes and size, following Balassa (1986), we have used a measure indicating
relative differences that takes values between 0 and 1. This measure is superior to utilizing the
absolute values of the differences, which are affected by the magnitudes of the particular country
characteristics in the different countries. The relative difference measure is shown in (4),
INEQ = 1 + [w lnw +(1-w) ln(1-w)] / ln2, where

(2)

w refers to the ratio of a particular country characteristic in country j to the sum of this
characteristic in country j and partner country k.41

It is hypothesized that the extent of intra-industry trade between any pair of countries will be:
(5) negatively correlated with the distance between them, representing the availability and the
cost of information necessary for trading differentiated products; and

41

This measure is symmetrical with respect to country characteristics; it is not affected by a change in the
unit of measurement, and it is a convex function of w.
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(6) positively correlated with the existence of common borders, indicating the possibilities for
intra-industry trade in response to locational advantages (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975).

In testing hypothesis (5), distance has been measured in terms of miles between the centers of
geographical gravity for each pair of countries. In turn, the existence of common borders
(hypothesis 6) has been represented by a dummy variable.

It is hypothesized that the extent of intra-industry trade between any pair of countries will be:
(7) positively correlated with participation in regional integration schemes, including the
European Union and the North American Free Trade Association, indicating the possibilities of
intra-industry trade in the framework of regional integration schemes.

(8) positively correlated with the use of a common language, including English, German, French,
and Scandinavian (Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish).

Hypothesis (7) has been tested by introducing dummy variables to represent participation in
the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). In testing
hypothesis (8), dummy variables are introduced for each of the languages for any pair of
countries where the same language is spoken.
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4 The Model
4.1 The Theory
This section summarizes the theoretical model; the following framework is similar to that of
Helpman (1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.7), and Kim and Oh (2001).

4.1.1 Closed Economy
Consider a 2 x 2 x 2 economy in which capital and labor are the only factors of production, and
output consists of two goods; the differentiated product X, and the homogeneous product Y. There
is a perfectly competitive market for Y. Monopolistic competition and economies of scale prevail
in industry X.
Consumers are assumed to maximize Cobb-Douglas utility functions,
n

U = (∑ xi ) (α / ρ ) y (1−α ) )
ρ

0< α <1, 0< ρ <1

(3)

i =1

where xi and y are the consumption levels for the respective products and n is the number of
differentiated products in the X industry, α and ρ are constants, and α is the share of total
consumption given to the consumption of X. Cost functions for X and Y are shown in Equations 4
and 5. The first cost function is homogeneous of degree one and the second cost function is a
homothetic function with economies of scale.

C ( w, r , Y ) = C Y ( w, r )Y

(4)

C ( w, r , X ) = C X ( w, r )e( X )

(5)

Here w, r are wage and rent respectively, e(X) is a differentiable decreasing function, which
implies the economies of scale. Cy(.) and Cx(.) are differentiable concave functions. From the
above presumptions, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions:
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1 = C Y ( w, r )

(6)

PS = C X ( w, r )

(7)

a LX ( w, r ) S + a LY ( w, r )Y = L

(8)

a KX ( w, r ) S + a KY ( w, r )Y = K

(9)

S
α
1
)( )
=(
Y
1 − α PS

(10)

⎛ e( X )
= ⎜⎜
ρ ⎝ e( X ) X

(11)

1

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

PX X
= PS
e( X )

(12)

n.e( X ) = S

(13)

The homogeneous product Y, is taken to be the numeraire ( PY = 1 ). S is an auxiliary variable
defined in Equation 13 for simple calculation, after Helpman (1981). PS is the price of S. L and K
are the capital and labor endowment of the economy. The model consists of eight equations,
where Equations 6-10 are identical to the Heckscher-Ohlin model. From these five equations, the
equilibrium values of the five endogenous variables w, r, PS , S, Y are obtained. The solutions for
X, PS , n are obtained from Equations 11-13, leading to solutions for all eight variables.
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4.1.2 Integrated Economy
Now consider a two-country model with identical production functions and utility functions. Free
trade between the countries equalizes the prices of products and factors of production. Thus, the
integrated economy under free trade shows the same characteristics as the closed economy. The
degree of difference in factor proportions is defined as in Equation 14.

DH =

K H LH
−
K
L

-1 ≤ D H ≤ 1

(14)

Here, the superscripts H and F denote the home and foreign country, respectively. L and K are
world labor and capital, and D H is the difference between the factor endowments of the countries.

D H > 0 implies that the home country is capital abundant and D H < 0 means that the home
country is labor abundant. From L = LH + LF and K = K H + K F , D F = − D H . If g H is
regarded as the share of the home economy in the integrated economy,

g

H

I H wLH + rK H
=
=
I
L

(15)

where I is the total income of the integrated economy and I H is the income of the home country.
For I F = I − I H , g F = 1 − g H . Using Equations 14 and 15, equations 16 and 17 are obtained.

LH = L( g H − θ K D H )

(16)

K H = K (g H + θ L D H )

(17)

Note that θ L + θ K = 1 and θ i (i = L, K ) is the share of factor i in total income. In the factor price
equalization area, there is a one-to-one relationship between the factor price and product price,
and the prices of the goods are given as constant in the integrated economy. Therefore, in
equilibrium, factor prices would not change, even if the factors were reallocated. If there is no
change in factor prices, there is no change in aij (i = L, K; j = X, Y). Therefore, aij is regarded as
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constant once the integrated economy is in equilibrium. Now, rearranging Equations 8 and 9,
Equations 18 and 19 are obtained.

Y = bKX L − bLX K

(18)

S = −bKY L + bLX K

(19)

Here, bij = aij / │A│, i = K, L; j = X, Y), and │A│= aLX aLY (kX - kY) and kX, kY denote capital-labor
ratio in the production (factor intensity). If X is capital intensive goods, │A│is positive because
kX > kY.
In the integrated economy, the goods prices and factor prices are identical between the
two countries and hence aij. Therefore, substituting LH , K H of Equations 18 and 19 into
equations 20 and 21, Y H and S H can be solved as follows.

Y H = Y . g H − φY D H

(20)

S H = S .g H + φ S D H

(21)

Here φY = bKX θ K L + bLX θ L K , φ S = bKY θ K L + bLY θ L K . If we put a superscript F instead of H,
we obtain the values for the foreign country, Y F and S F . Now we know that the production level
in each country depends on bij (i = L, K; j = X, Y), the relative size of the economy, g, and the
difference in factor abundance, D. Here, since bij depends on aij, which is given by the
characteristics of the production function and the utility function, we say that the equilibrium
production in a country is determined by g and D.
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4.1.3 Trade Volume and Trade Pattern
Consider two types of trade; inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade. If sector X produces
differentiated products, we see a two-way flow of good X, which implies intra-industry trade.
Note that the home residents consume a proportion g H of world output, since preferences in the
two countries are assumed to be identical. Therefore, if the home country is a capital abundant
country ( D H > 0) and X is a capital intensive good, the home country will export X and import X
and Y. Here, the sum of net exports of X and the imports of Y will give the value of inter-industry
trade (H). Assuming balance trade, the total value of exports of X is equal to the total value of
imports of X and Y. From the fact that inter-industry trade will be two times as large as net
exports of X, Equation 24 is obtained.

H = 2( PS S H − g H PS S )

DH ≥ 0

(22)

The intra-industry trade (G) is defined as in Equation 25;

G = 2 min( EX , IM )

(23)

where EX and IM are the values of exports and imports, respectively. Under the assumption that X
is a capital intensive good, if the home country is capital abundant ( D H > 0), we have net exports
of X (EX > IM). Thus, intra-industry trade in sector X will be shown as Equation 24.

G = 2 IM = 2 g H PS S F

DH ≥ 0

(24)

Now total volume of trade is expressed as
VT = H + G

(25)

Putting Equations 20 and 21 into Equations 22, 24, 25 the following system of equations
(under D H ≥ 0 ) is obtained:
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H = 2 PS φ S ) D H

(26)

G = 2 PS S ( g F g H ) − 2 PS φ S ( g H D H )

(27)

VT = 2 PS S ( g F g H ) + 2 PS φ S ( g F D H )

(28)

Now, consider an IIT index, B, as the ratio of IIT to total trade

B=

G
VT

(29)

Substituting Equations 27 and 28 into Equation 31, one obtains

B=

S ( g F g H ) − φS ( g H D H )
S ( g F g H ) + φS ( g F D H )

(30)

Here, three interesting relationships are found. First, if D = 0, B will be one. This implies that if
relative factor endowments of the two countries are identical, the IIT index is one, regardless of
the size of the integrated economy. Second, B increases as the absolute value of D becomes
smaller, given g. What this means is that given the size of the integrated economy, the IIT index
will increase as the relative factor endowments of the two countries become more similar. Third,
the IIT index increases as the sizes of the two economies become similar, given the relative factor
endowments.
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4.2 Results of the Empirical Analysis
To test the hypotheses which are stated in Section 3.4, the following equation is estimated:

IIT = β 1 + β 2 AveGNP + β 3 AveGNP / cap + β 4 DifGNP + β 5 DifGNP / cap +

β 6 Dislance + β 7 Borders + β 8 EU + β 9 NAFTA + β10 English + β11German +
β12 French + β13 Scandinavian + ε ,
where IIT is the bilateral Grubel-Lloyd intra-industry trade index calculated for each pair of
countries using the weighted average of the 44 three-digit SITC industry grouping in SITC 7.
AveGNP is the variable indicating the average country (economy) size of any pair of countries,
AveGNP/cap is the average of the per capita incomes of any pair of countries, DifGNP is the
difference in country (economy) size between any pair of countries, DifGNP/cap is the difference
in per capita incomes of any pair of countries, Distance is the distance between any pair of
countries, Borders is a dummy variable which equals one if there is a common border between
any pair of countries, EU is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries participate in
EU, NAFTA is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries participate in NAFTA,
English is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries use English as a common
language, German is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries use German as a
common language, French is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries use French
as a common language, Scandinavian is a dummy variable which equals one if the two countries
use Scandinavian (Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish) as a common language.

Table 1 reports the results for both regressions; OLS and truncated regression:
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Table 1
Estimation of Intra-Industry Trade in a Multi-Country and Multi-Industry Framework
(OLS and Truncated regression with robust standard errors)
__________________________________________________________________________
OLS
Truncated
Dep. Variable: IIT
Dep. Variable: IIT
Coefficient Std. Marginal Coefficient Std. Marginal
Error Effect
Error Effect
Constant
Average GNP
Average
GNP/capita
Difference in
GNP
Difference in
GNP/capita
Distance
Borders
EU
NAFTA
English
German
French
Scandinavian

-0.766*
0.451 -0.766
0.060*** 0.012 0.060
0.116*** 0.045 0.116

-0.804* 0.485
0.077*** 0.017
0.118*** 0.045

-0.783
0.075
0.115

-0.192*** 0.037 -0.192

-0.222*** 0.041

-0.217

-0.705*** 0.147 -0.705

-0.793*** 0.177

-0.772

-0.051***
0.046*
0.068***
0.226***
0.069**
0.152***
0.169***
0.019

-0.062***
0.051*
0.062***
0.191***
0.077**
0.148***
0.169***
0.028

-0.061
0.031
0.062
0.186
0.075
0.144
0.164
0.027

0.010
0.030
0.018
0.049
0.034
0.032
0.027
0.041

-0.051
0.046
0.068
0.226
0.069
0.152
0.169
0.019

0.011
0.028
0.023
0.051
0.033
0.032
0.026
0.044

R2 = 0.577
R2 = 0.621
N = 258
N = 258
__________________________________________________________________
***Significant at the 1 % level
**Significant at the 5 % level
*Significant at the 10 % level

The empirical results support the hypotheses put forward in Section 3.4 of the paper. As expected,
the extent of intra-industry trade is positively correlated with average GNP, average GNP/capita,
and the existence of a common border; and it is negatively correlated with differences in GNP
and GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are highly significant statistically. Moreover, the
EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected positive sign and are highly significant
statistically. In turn, the regression coefficients of the language dummy variables have a positive
sign, but their level of statistical significance varies. The German, and French language variables
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are significant at the 1 % level, the English variable is significant at the 5% level, while the
Scandinavian language variable is not significant at even the 10 % level. The coefficient of
determination is 0.577 in the OLS regression and it is 0.621 in the truncated regression.

A further question concerns the relative importance of the individual variables in
explaining variations in the extent of intra-industry trade. In the following table we report the
increase of the coefficient of determination resulting from the inclusion of an explanatory
variable, given the use of all the other variables, in regard to intra-industry trade among all
countries.
Table 2
Comparison of the Coefficients of Determination in Different Models
OLS
Truncated
Dep. Variable: IIT
Dep. Variable: IIT
______________________________________
______R2
Difference R2
Difference___
Model 1: With all variables
Model 2: Average GNP excluded
Model 3: Difference in GNP excluded
Model 4: Difference in GNP/capita excluded
Model 5: Distance excluded
Model 6: EU&NAFTA excluded
Model 7: All Languages excluded
Model 8: EU excluded
Model 9: Average GNP/capita excluded
Model 10: English excluded
Model 11: German excluded
Model 12: NAFTA excluded
Model 13: Borders excluded
Model 14: French excluded
Model 15: Scandinavian excluded
Model 16: Industry excluded
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0.577
0.402
0.496
0.529
0.538
0.555
0.559
0.560
0.560
0.568
0.569
0.571
0.573
0.573
0.576
0.576

0.175
0.081
0.048
0.039
0.022
0.018
0.017
0.017
0.009
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.004
0.001
0.001

0.621
0.452
0.526
0.569
0.586
0.595
0.598
0.602
0.603
0.608
0.609
0.612
0.613
0.615
0.618
0.620

0.169
0.095
0.052
0.035
0.026
0.023
0.019
0.018
0.013
0.012
0.009
0.008
0.006
0.003
0.001

The results show that the variables Average GNP and Difference in GNP are the country
characteristics that contribute the most to the explanatory power of the regression equations,
followed by Difference in GNP / capita, Distance, EU and NAFTA together, all Languages, EU,
and Average GNP / capita. By contrast, introduction of the language variables adds little to the
explanatory power of the equations.

At this point it is appropriate to ask whether the results might differ if industry variables
such as degree of product differentiation and degree of product standardization were introduced
into the estimation. This question has been addressed in Balassa and Bauwens (1987) and it is
shown that differences in the values of the regression coefficients for country characteristics in no
case attain 2%. At the same time, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is
hardly affected and the coefficient of determination changed only slightly from 0.436 to 0.443 by
adding industry characteristics.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has tested various hypotheses about the determinants of intra-industry specialization in
manufactured goods, including common and specific country characteristics. The study covers 24
countries exporting manufactured goods; calculations have been made for bilateral trade flows
among all the 24 countries.

The hypotheses put forward in the theoretical literature in regard to common country
characteristics are generally confirmed by the empirical results. Thus, the extent of intra-industry
trade is positively correlated with average income levels, average country size, and the existence
of common borders and it is negatively correlated with income inequality, inequality in country
size, and distance. All the variables are highly significant.

We also found that the extent of intra-industry trade and participation in the EU, and the
NAFTA are positively correlated, with all the coefficients being highly significant in the relevant
equations. Also, the language variables have the expected positive sign whenever they are
statistically significant, which is the case in most instances.
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation provides three essays on strategic trade policies, intra-industry trade, and income
convergence. The assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition are often
violated in the real world. Traditional trade theory based on perfect competition does not
effectively explain phenomena such as intra-industry trade and the high volume of trade between
similar countries. Moreover, such models failed to successfully integrate some important policy
related considerations, such as increasing returns to scale, learning-by-doing, R&D, and interfirm strategic rivalries. Effective analysis of these topics requires imperfect competition, which
together with increasing returns to scale is one of the main characteristics of many of today’s
industries, especially of those in the industrialized countries. As new theories of imperfectly
competitive markets have developed, game-theoretic approach of strategic trade policy began to
emerge in the early 1980’s.

As a strategic trade policy instrument, an export subsidy used by the foreign government
could be “countervailed” by a domestic import tariff. The interesting point about these
countervailing effects is that they do not eliminate incentives to use active strategic trade policy,
and the policy equilibrium normally implies positive subsidies and tariffs.

It may be of a particular interest to integrate the strategic trade policy with the
hierarchical games in firm theory. Traditional economic theory considers firms as economic
agents with the single objective of profit maximization. Some have criticized this as being
simplistic, arguing that real firms may have a different goal. Several theories have suggested that
large firms are more concerned with maximizing revenues or market shares rather than profits.
Recent advances in international trade theory emphasize strategic behavior among firms of
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different countries and its implication for trade policy. With the separation of ownership,
management, and workers various incentive structures exist within a modern corporation. In order
to correctly assess the policy intervention in international trade, it is important to understand how
trade policies affect intra-firm incentives and vice versa.

It is generally argued that a proper analysis of the firm’s objective function should be
based on the analysis of the owner-manager relationship. A manager’s objective depends on the
structure of the incentives that his owner sets to motivate him. Owners often index managerial
compensation to profits, sales, output, quality, and some other variables. Even if the owners want
to maximize profits, the incentive system they design may imply managerial incentives which are
different from profit maximization. The principal (firm owner) can distort the incentives of his
agents (firm managers) in order to affect the outcome of the competition between his agent and
competing agents. In general, the owner of a firm will adjust his managers’ incentives in such a
way that it will cause rival agents to change their behavior in favor of that firm.

Chapter 2 is concerned with strategic managerial delegation and its implications for
international trade policy. Corporate firms, with separation of management and ownership,
compete in international markets. We ask how trade policy affects the incentive to managers,
which in turn affects the impact of trade policy on prices and quantities. Our paper combines the
models of Collie (1994) and Sklivas (1987) in a single integrated analytical framework. The
integrated model has a modest contribution to the literature by investigating the strategic trade
policies under duopoly in a multistage game with endogenous timing of trade policy when the
ownership and the management are separated for each firm.
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In Chapter 2, trade policy is modeled as a multi-stage game and the timing of trade policy
decisions is endogenous. At the beginning of the game, stage zero, home and foreign
governments independently and simultaneously choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or
at stage two. Then, at the chosen stage, each government sets its trade policy to maximize its
national welfare. The home government uses an import tariff to shift rent from the foreign firm
and a production subsidy to correct the domestic distortion due to imperfect competition. The
foreign government uses an export subsidy to shift profits from the home firm to the foreign firm.
If, at stage zero, both governments choose to set trade policy at the same stage of the game, then
the outcome will be a simultaneous-move trade policy game. If the home [foreign] government
chooses to move at stage one and the foreign [home] government chooses to move at stage two,
then the outcome will be a Stackelberg game where the home [foreign] government is the
Stackelberg leader. At stage three the owners will simultaneously write and announce contracts
with their managers that specify how they will be rewarded. Finally, the managers will
simultaneously choose their firms’ outputs. The appropriate solution for this multistage game is
the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is obtained by applying the Nash equilibrium to all the
stages of the game by the process of backward induction.

The results show that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game, the
home government sets its tariff and production subsidy at stage one and the foreign government
sets its export subsidy at stage two. By setting trade policy at stage one the home government
commits itself to a lower tariff and production subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move game, and this encourages the foreign government to use a larger export
subsidy than in the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. As a result both countries
are better off when the home government is the Stackelberg leader than in the simultaneous-move
game. The home country benefits from a larger foreign export subsidy, and the foreign country
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gains from facing a lower tariff and production subsidy. The conclusion for trade policy is that
imperfect competition does not provide an economic rationale for countervailing duties since the
home country should commit not to use countervailing duties. When compared to those of Collie
(1994), our results show that home and foreign welfares are higher, home firm’s profits are lower,
and foreign firm’s profits are higher in each of the three games, i.e. simultaneous-move trade
policy game, Stackelberg game when the home government is the Stackelberg leader, and
Stackelberg game when the foreign government is the Stackelberg leader.

Chapter 3 analyzes the relationship between international trade and income convergence
among countries by focusing on groups of countries comprising major trade partners. The subject
of convergence of economic growth is one of the most important issues in modern economics. In
a world in which countries exchange goods, factors, and ideas; international linkages are what
drive any convergence process. Free trade in goods can equalize factor prices across countries
according to the factor-price-equalization theorem; international flows of factors can lead to
convergence of endowments and factor prices; and international flows of technology can cause
convergence of factor prices as well.

In neoclassical growth models a country’s per capita growth rate tends to be inversely
related to its starting level of per capita income. In particular, if countries are similar with respect
to structural parameters for preferences and technology, then poor countries tend to grow faster
than rich countries. That is, it is a prediction of neoclassical economic growth theory that
differences in per capita income across different economies will tend to decrease or disappear
over time. This is broadly referred to as the convergence hypothesis.
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Though there is evidence of income convergence among some of the wealthy countries
(Baumol, 1986; Baumol et al., 1989), it is not obvious why some subsets of these countries
exhibit greater convergence than others, while other subsets of countries display no convergence
tendencies at all. Chapter 3 analyzes this issue from the perspective of trade’s contribution to the
process. It examines the relationship between international trade and income convergence among
countries by focusing on groups of countries forming major trade partners.

The analysis includes the 1971-2002 income and trade data of 24 developed countries42
with per capita incomes of $10, 000 or higher in 2002. The first step is to determine each
country’s primary trade partners and to create trade groups using the intra-industry trade shares of
the total trade between countries. Having formed the trade groups, the behavior of each group’s
income differentials over time is examined for a significant evidence of convergence within them.
The results show that majority of these intra-industry trade-based groups exhibit significant
convergence. When the trade groups are formed according to the total trade between the countries
rather than intra-industry trade, we see a significant decrease in the number of the groups which
exhibit income convergence.

Then, the robustness and sensitivity of the results are examined from a number of
different perspectives. To test whether any random grouping of these same countries might
produce similar results, the 24 source countries are grouped into their many different possible
subgroups and their convergence coefficients are estimated. To test whether convergence within
groups might be towards one country that is common to most of the groups, the major trade
partner of the countries is removed from each of the groups, the new convergence coefficients are

42

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
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estimated, and the results are compared. To test whether the tendency towards convergence is
considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than proximity or
common language, the countries are regrouped to reflect geographical closeness or common
languages; and the degree of convergence within each of these groups are then compared to the
results of the trade-based groups.

The results show that significant income convergence is not a common outcome among
countries when they are grouped randomly instead of grouping them according to their trade
partners; the convergence within groups is not towards one country that is common to most of the
groups, but is instead an outcome that tends to be relatively robust to the exclusion of the major
trade partners that are members in most of the groups; and the tendency towards convergence
appears to be considerably stronger when the basis for constructing groups is trade rather than
proximity or common language.

Chapter 4 provides recent evidence on determinants of the bilateral intra-industry trade in
a multi-country & multi-industry framework. Bilateral trade data of the year 2002 at three-digit
SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) industry groups is used for 24 developed
countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.

First, a theoretical summary of a two-country model based on product differentiation and
economies of scale is provided, following Helpman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman (1985).
Then, using this model, the determinants of bilateral intra-industry trade are analyzed in the trade
of each country with every other country in each industry category. The hypotheses that are tested
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in this study investigate the effect of the following country characteristics on the bilateral intraindustry trade: average country size, average per capita income, country size difference, per
capita income difference, distance, common border, participation in economic integration
systems, and common language.

Chapter 4 follows closely the studies of Helpman (1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985,
ch.7), and Kim and Oh (2001). This research contributes to the existing literature of intra-industry
trade in several ways. This study employs very recent trade data, namely data of 2002. Second,
the data in the analysis is wide-ranging43; 24 developed countries are included. Third, this study
concentrates on testing country characteristics while most empirical studies44 of intra-industry
trade have concentrated on testing industry characteristics such as economies of scale and product
differentiation. Fourth, the empirical analysis covers a wide variety of country characteristics
together, which are developed separately in the literature, i.e., average country size, average per
capita income, country size difference, per capita income difference, distance, common border,
participation in economic integration systems, and common language.

The empirical results show that the extent of intra-industry trade is positively correlated
with average GNP, average GNP/capita, and the existence of a common border; and it is
negatively correlated with differences in GNP and GNP/capita, and distance. All the variables are
highly significant statistically. The EU and NAFTA dummy variables have the expected positive
sign and are highly significant statistically. The regression coefficients of the language dummy

43

The total number of observations is expected to be 12, 144 (= 24C2 (= 276) country combinations x 44
SITC categories) but in considerable amount of cases (18 %) neither exports nor imports exist in bilateral
trade flows. Then the index of intra-industry trade is not defined and these observations are excluded from
the analysis.
44
Clark (1993), Lundberg (1992), Ray (1991), Hamilton and Kniest (1991), Marvel and Ray (1987),
Balassa (1986), Greenaway and Milner (1984).
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variables have a positive sign, but their level of statistical significance varies. Moreover, the
results show that the variables Average GNP and Difference in GNP are the country
characteristics that contribute the most to the explanatory power of the regression equations.
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